Federalism, checks and the welfare state:  a cross national analysis by Beal, Amanda Louise
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2006
Federalism, checks and the welfare state: a cross
national analysis
Amanda Louise Beal
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beal, Amanda Louise, "Federalism, checks and the welfare state: a cross national analysis" (2006). LSU Master's Theses. 3134.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/3134
  
 
FEDERALISM, CHECKS AND 
THE WELFARE STATE: 
A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
 
in 
 
 
The Department of Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Amanda L. Beal 
B.A., Indiana University, 2002 
August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This thesis was completed with the diligent support of my committee members: Dr. 
William Clark, Dr. Leonard Ray and Dr. Cameron Thies.  I would also like to acknowledge the 
help received from Dr. Wonik Kim and the effort put forth for inter-coder reliability by Ashley 
Ross. 
 
Amanda Beal 
Louisiana State University 
 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………… ii 
 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………... iv 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………… v 
 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. 1 
Conceptualizing the Welfare State………………………………………………..  2 
 
Review of Literature……………………………………………………………………… 7 
Theoretical Justifications for the Welfare State………………………………….. 8 
Theoretical Justifications for the Diverse Forms of the Welfare State………....... 14 
Globalization and the Retrenchment of the Welfare State……………………...... 30 
 
Variables and Methods…………………………………………………………………….. 35 
The Welfare State as a Dependent Variable........................................................... 36 
Institutional Impediments to the Welfare State………………………………….. 43 
Control Variables………………………………………………………………… 52 
The United States:  An Historical Example……………………………………... 56 
Designing an Approach.......................................................................................... 64 
 
Results and Discussion……………………………………………………………………. 67 
Fractionalization, Federalism and Checks...............…………………………….. 71 
Discussion.............................................................................................................. 75 
 
Summary and Conclusion…………………………………………………………………. 79 
A Prescription for Future Endeavors……………………………………………. 82 
 
References………………………………………………………………………………. 84 
 
Appendix A:  List of the 32 Countries in the Analysis.................................................... 89 
 
Appendix B:  Lijphart’s Majoritarian and Consensus Features....................................... 90 
 
Appendix C:  Esping-Anderson’s Combined De-commodification Index…………….. 91 
 
Appendix D:  Pensions Replacement Rate Sample for 36 Countries……………………. 92 
 
Appendix E:  Alternate Regression Results.................................................................... 93 
 
Vita…………………………………………………………………………………….. 95 
 
 iv
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. Executive-Parties Dimension Results............................................................................... 68 
 
2. Federal-Unitary Dimension Results................................................................................. 70 
 
3. Institutional Impediments to the Size of the Welfare State............................................. 72  
 
4. Institutional Impediments to the Amount of Social Expenditure.................................... 74 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is often asserted in the institutional literature that there is a trade-off between effective 
and efficient government.  Effective government is often stipulated to be more representative, 
while efficient government is considered superior at passing legislation.  This analysis critiques 
Arend Lijphart’s theory that consensus democracies are more representative, and therefore, result 
in “kinder, gentler” democracies with more encompassing social policies.  I hypothesize that 
more representative government – operationalized as having higher levels of fractionalization 
within the legislature, more federalism and more checks within the system – is actually more 
effective at translating the median voter’s preference for occupationally dependent or targeted 
welfare policies into legislation.  Consequently, states with more institutional autonomy will be 
more efficient at passing larger forms of welfare legislation.  Through a cross sectional OLS 
multivariate regression analysis, I find that federalism is negatively correlated with the level of 
social expenditure across states. However, my results also suggest that “Downsian” platform 
convergence may actually make more representation in the legislature conducive to social policy 
implementation.  These findings suggest that representative features within government actually 
have mixed effects on the emergence of social policies and that better measures for these 
independent variables as well as a more accurate measure for the welfare state are imperative to 
future welfare state studies. 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The diversity among welfare states is inextricably linked to many factors including, but 
perhaps not limited to, the strength of different groups within the society, the state's level of 
economic development and the governmental components of the state.  When focusing on the 
political factors that have influenced the emergence of the welfare state, a focus on governmental 
institutions engineered by state builders may offer a comparable way of determining the 
likelihood of certain social policies.  States with a larger degree of federalism and more 
legislative levels within the federal government may be more representative of the median 
voter’s preference for targeted or occupationally dependent social policies, and therefore, less 
likely to pass encompassing welfare legislation. 
An institutional approach can evaluate the possibility of the median voters’ preferences –
as opposed to those of the autonomy of state legislators – being translated into legislation 
through better representation in the decision making process.  It is argued that federal states with 
more checks within the national government are more representative, but that these institutional 
features create less autonomy for representatives in the legislative process and inhibit efficient 
policy-making.  Therefore, these states are expected to be less likely to pass encompassing 
welfare legislation while better reflecting the median voters’ interests.  States that have the 
highest autonomy through the centralization of power in the legislative process, seeking to 
perpetuate themselves as actors, may be better able to pass universal welfare policies.  This 
analysis offers an overview of the welfare state concepts, the theoretical justifications behind the 
emergence of the welfare state, the previous research that has attempted to explain the varied 
forms of the welfare state, a critique of this research, and finally, an approach to studying welfare 
states that will hopefully help to determine whether federalism and more checks within the 
 2 
system (or veto points) actually do inhibit the ability of representatives to pass more 
encompassing welfare legislation.  In addition, this research will examine the impact of 
fractionalization within the legislature.  Arend Lijphart’s findings in Patterns of Democracy 
suggest that fractionalization increases representation and may result in kinder-gentler 
democracies with a larger welfare state.  However, if fractionalization increases the 
representation of the median voter then it should also impede social policy implementation.  To 
approach this analysis in a more elucidating manner, it is important to discuss the fundamental 
concepts within the welfare state literature.  This approach will also be constructive when the 
study attends to how the preceding research has measured the welfare state as a dependent 
variable. 
Conceptualizing the Welfare State 
 Many researchers use the terms welfare state, welfare regime, social policy, and social 
insurance as if they are interchangeable.  However, the phrase “welfare state” is actually used to 
describe the policies that a government has towards taking care of the people within its society 
through social policies such as cash benefits, health care, education, unemployment coverage, 
disability, old age benefits, and food and housing assistance.  The welfare state encompasses any 
kind of social policy implemented by the state.  A welfare regime type indicates the relationship 
between the state, the market and society whereas the welfare state type explains the nature of 
the connection between the state and the market.  “Welfare regime” is a phrase coined by Gøsta 
Esping-Anderson that represents not only the states’ role in welfare but also societal influences.  
According to Esping-Anderson, there are interactive historical forces that have forged specific 
welfare regimes: “first, the pattern of working-class political formation and, second, political 
coalition-building in the transition from a rural economy to a middle-class society…. Third, past 
 3 
reforms have contributed decisively to the institutionalization of class preferences and political 
behavior.”
1
  Notably, within welfare states and welfare regimes, there are a number of mixed 
types of social policies. 
 Social policies are predominantly targeted assistance, occupational insurance or universal 
programs.  Targeted welfare policies are directed at individuals who meet a demonstratable need 
requirement.  These benefits are usually needs-based, meager redistribution supplements.  
Occupational welfare benefits are income dependent through the employee’s business or 
industry; the benefits are directly linked to employee contributions. Occupational insurance can 
also be corporatist in the sense that the benefits are directed through a business sector or industry 
instead of through a specific employer.  The predominance of occupationally dependent and 
targeted welfare policies are often classified together as Bismarckian welfare states because, 
unlike universal welfare policies, they cover different groups in society under different schemes 
and are usually linked to an individual’s work history or employment status.
2
   
Universal welfare policies prescribe equal benefits to all citizens regardless of 
employment history or status. Under a universal welfare state, often called the Beveridgean 
model, “citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income or general welfare, opt out 
of work when they themselves consider it necessary.”
3
  The Beveridgean and Bismarckian 
welfare policy distinctions classify the welfare state under these two models according to the 
                                                
1
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objectives, benefits, eligibility, coverage and financing of the programs.  For the Beveridgean 
model, the main objective is the prevention of poverty, the benefits are a flat rate, entitlement is 
based either only on residence or residence and need, coverage is offered to the entire population 
and the programs are funded through taxation.  In the case of the Bismarckian model, the main 
objective is income maintenance, the benefits are earnings related, eligibility is decided by an 
individual’s record of contribution and it is financed largely through contributions.
4
   
Esping-Anderson classifies welfare states as liberal, conservative or socialist welfare 
regimes.  These clusters allow for the placement of states on a scale from most to least 
encompassing policies.  Socialist welfare regimes promote equality to the highest standards 
through universalism.  Conservative welfare regimes include policies that uphold status 
differences such as class and status rights.  These conservative regimes have a corporatist-statist 
legacy and are devoted to traditional family values because of, as Esping-Anderson asserts, the 
church’s influence in the society.  Liberal welfare regimes are committed to market efficiency.  
Liberal welfare policies are usually targeted at low-income, working class and/or state dependent 
people and the benefits are usually less redistributive.
5
  Gregory Kasza offers an almost crippling 
critique of Esping-Anderson’s classifications.  He asserts that these welfare regimes should 
acknowledge policy shifts because welfare states are not static.  For example, Sweden was liberal 
with targeted reforms until the early twentieth century when it moved toward socialist reforms 
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University Press. 
  
 5 
and Japan does not fit under any of these clusters.
6
  Esping-Anderson’s response would be that 
his three clusters are regime ideal types not states because they have cultural significance within 
his analysis. While classifying welfare states is an imperative endeavor, it incurs considerable 
problems when attempting a quantitative comparative analysis of welfare states.  Esping-
Anderson’s classifications are often used in welfare state studies, yet his measures are also 
problematic.   
Whether a state is classified as having a universal, corporatist or targeted policy structure, 
as being a Bismarckian or Beveridgean model or as being a liberal, conservative or socialist 
welfare regime, the problem still remains that most states have mixed systems.  This issue 
hinders classification not only because a country may have one type of health insurance program 
and another type of old-age pension plan, but also because some states have two types of social 
policies within one type of program.  For example, Canada has a universal pension system and a 
social insurance pension system.  The universal pension program covers all residents, yet the 
earnings-related pension covers only the employees or self-employed individuals who have paid 
into the pension fund.  Italy’s sickness program is similarly structured with a universal medical 
care system and a cash benefits social insurance system.  Many countries have equally mixed 
program structures, ipso facto, delineating either a comparative qualitative classification or 
quantitative measure is difficult. 
This analysis will address the issues regarding a measure for the welfare state that are 
embedded in social policy studies.  Nevertheless, it is first essential to review the previous 
welfare state studies in order to correctly address the role of state-centered or institutional 
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theories on the emergence of diverse forms of the welfare state.  This study argues that the 
median voters’ preferences are better represented in states with a higher degree of federalism and 
more checks within the system because these features decrease the state’s autonomy and thereby 
decrease the ability of representatives to use these institutions to shape culture around more 
inclusive reforms.  What follows is an overview of the theoretical justifications behind the 
welfare state, including some theoretical support for the assumption that the median voter 
actually prefers targeted or occupational welfare policies and conversely, if given the autonomy, 
the state will seek to increase its role in welfare through more encompassing social policies. 
 7 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There is little debate over the theory that capitalism and industrialization marked a 
fundamental shift in the role of the state.  Pre-capitalist societies had predominantly agricultural 
economies, but the advent of capitalism and industrialization required the eradication of the 
peasantry and a shift toward urban workers in a skilled labor force.  However, the reason that this 
new labor force led to the emergence of the welfare state is heavily debated.  Capitalism and 
industrialization changed the relationship between the state, society and the market.  Before 
industrialization, concepts such as the market, social insurance or unemployment did not exist.   
The introduction of the idea of the market turned human needs and labor power into a 
commodity or as Gøsta Esping-Anderson asserts, “our well-being came to depend on our relation 
to the cash nexus.”
7
  In feudal societies, individuals relied for security on the family, the church 
or the lord.  Capitalism changed the nature of these relationships because people were entering 
the work force among other individuals to whom they had no previous community ties, thus the 
labor market incurred a competition for wages; people were competitively selling their labor and 
needed insurance against the market.
8
  This shift from feudalism to capitalism abetted many 
societal changes that researchers are still deliberating over in the twenty-first century.   
Perhaps as Ronald Inglehart argues: 
“From the Industrial Revolution until well into the second half of the twentieth 
century, industrial society underwent Modernization.  This process transformed 
political and cultural systems from traditional regimes legitimated by religious 
belief systems to rational-legal states legitimated by their claim to maximize the 
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 8 
welfare of their people through scientific expertise.  It was a transfer of authority 
from family and religious institutions to political institutions.”
9
   
 
Even if Inglehart is correct and this transformation shifted authority into the hands of the state, 
there is still little explanation as to why the state intervened through welfare or why welfare 
states emerged in such varied forms.  The emergence and growth of the welfare state in its varied 
forms is a primary concern for economists and social scientists because the necessity of and 
repercussions from social policies are both diverse and ambiguous. 
Theoretical Justifications for the Welfare State 
Similar to Inglehart’s stipulation that Modernization and the transfer of authority were a 
repercussion of economic growth, many social scientists point out the link between economic 
factors and the emergence and growth of the welfare state.  Some researchers argue that the 
market and the state do not exist outside their roles as allocation mechanisms.  The market 
cannot survive as a decentralized mechanism without the existence of a centralized mechanism, 
such as the state, to act as an allocation mechanism by legislating the boundaries of the market 
forces.  Karl Polanyi stipulates, “the idea of a self adjusting market implied a stark utopia.  Such 
an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural 
substance of society.”
10
  Polanyi asserts that the liberal concept of a self-regulating market was 
flawed because the market required positive government activity in the form of the welfare state. 
                                                
9
 Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization:  Cultural, Economic and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
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 Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. New York and Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart. 
 Pp. 3. 
 9 
Similarly, it is often presumed that the failure of the market required state intervention as 
a centralized mechanism in the form of social policy legislation.  Adam Przeworski contends the 
following: 
“The discovery of market failures in the early 1950s led indeed to a view of 
governments that could be termed ‘the market-failure theory of the state.’  This 
theory was best captured by the 1959 program of the German Social Democratic 
Party: ‘markets whenever possible, the state whenever necessary.’  The idea was 
that markets ‘should be left to themselves’ to do things they do well but 
governments should step in to correct their functioning when they fail.  Hence, the 
proper role of the state was to regulate monopolies, provide public goods, and 
correct for externalities.”
11
 
 
Before state level intervention, it was assumed that if someone really needed welfare 
support they could rely on private charity. Therefore, the social policies before 1910 were largely 
poor-law customs addressed at the local level.  In Welfare, Democracy and the New Deal, 
William Brock asserts  
“In all [subnational] states [of the United States], the basic law for the 
administration of relief was derived directly from the English law of 1601.  Its 
basic principles were that no one should starve, that the responsibility for giving 
relief should be clear and inescapable, and that able-bodied persons who refused 
to work and depended on others for support should be subjected to severe 
penalties.”
12
 
 
Neither the depression of the 1930s nor the market failures of the 1950s mark the 
emergence of the welfare state.  As Nicholas Barr states, “Intervention other than locally 
financed poor relief began in the early nineteenth century with subsidies for education and 
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increasing public health activities.”
13
  Przeworski refers to the market failures of the 1950s, but 
this “failure” occurred well after the emergence and initial growth of most welfare states not only 
in the United States but also in Sweden, Venezuela and many other states.  In addition, the 
depression may have accelerated the growth of the welfare state but social policies had already 
grown from local poor laws to subnational level and minimal national level legislation, ipso facto 
there is little evidence to substantiate the claim that the market ever failed or needed rescuing 
through state intervention prior to the emergence of the welfare state.   
Similar to the market-failure theory of the state, the logic of industrialism argument holds 
that the emergence of the welfare state was inextricably linked to the economy.  Unlike the 
market failure theory, the logic of industrialism hypothesis stipulates that the key element in this 
process was industrialization, not a market failure.  Presumably, economic development in the 
form of industrialization caused social and demographic changes that precipitated an 
evolutionary process.  However, the logic of industrialism thesis is an attempt at a universal 
theory that does not allow for variations in the welfare state.  Also, as Peter Flora and Jens Alber 
point out, the timing and degree of industrialization do not correspond to social policy 
implementation in cross-national comparisons.
14
  Venezuela was one of the first states to 
implement state-level social policies, yet not the first to go through industrialization.  
Additionally, as is the issue with many theories that try to offer economic justifications for the 
welfare state, the logic of industrialism literature makes a functionalist argument.  As Daniel 
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Little explains, “This [reasoning] … raises the problem of teleology (explaining a circumstance 
in terms of its future effects).  A cause cannot occur later in time than its effects ….”
15
 
Consequently, the welfare state simply cannot be explained in terms of the benefits it may offer, 
indeed those benefits are heavily debated.   
There is a great deal of debate, as well, concerning whether social policies adversely or 
advantageously affect a state’s economic stability or growth.  Many researchers postulate that a 
larger welfare state increases the health of individual workers which will, in turn, decrease 
worker turnover, increase employee satisfaction, increase productivity and help the overall 
economy.  However, Milton Friedman, along with many economists, is an advocate for freer 
markets.  He stipulates that the welfare state is inefficient and that greater individual freedom in 
the market will stimulate the economy.  As a supporting argument, David Cameron’s analysis of 
18 states suggests a tradeoff between economic equality within society and the economic growth 
of society: 
“Nations such as the United States, Japan, Spain, and Italy ... have, in a sense, 
opted for a relatively inegalitarian distribution of income and an increasing rate of 
private accumulation.  Other nations … have attained a relatively greater degree 
of economic equality at the cost of lower rates of private capital accumulation.”
16
   
 
Cameron’s analysis suggests that states with higher taxes, like those that support a larger welfare 
state, sacrifice economic growth in the form of private capital expansion.  Yet the debate over the 
economic repercussions of the welfare state is far from resolved.  Unlike Cameron’s analysis, 
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 12
Bruce Moon and William Dixon find support for the human capital theory.  They assert the 
following: 
“There is no evidence for the orthodox view that either basic needs fulfillment or 
improvements in basic needs provision compromise future growth…. [T]here 
exists a complementarity in which the achievement of welfare goals helps in the 
later achievement of growth goals via the mechanism of human capital 
investment.”
17
   
 
The welfare state is sometimes stipulated to be beneficial to the state’s overall economy through 
an investment in human capital, but it has also been asserted that the welfare state impedes 
economic growth through private capital investment.  An “evolutionary process” that is 
explained (through a functionalist argument) in terms of its benefits must first be able to prove 
beneficial, yet the welfare state is not necessarily accepted as a beneficial phenomenon.  Some 
researchers argue that local community or subnational level policies are actually more conducive 
to the state. 
Researchers are also still contemplating whether state administered social policies are 
beneficial or detrimental to individuals and their participation in the market.  Some theories 
postulate that when social policies allow individuals to survive outside of participation in the 
market, they actually discourage participation in the market and therefore encourage class 
distinctions and cycles of poverty within the society.  Again, given that there is little consensus 
over the necessity of the welfare state and its subsequent benefits, a functionalist argument 
concerning the emergence of the welfare state through its advantages is problematic.  In addition, 
theories that strive to uncover economic justifications of state intervention in welfare as a 
singular phenomenon, such as the market-failure or logic of industrialism literature, are 
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 13
intrinsically flawed by reason of their lack of enlightenment about why social policies emerged 
in such various forms.  Esping-Anderson stipulated that capitalism incurred a competition for 
wages and Inglehart asserted that there was a transition from a reliance or belief in the role of 
traditional institutions (such as the church or family) to secular-rational authority in the form of 
the state.  Perhaps the newly found strength of and individual-level belief in the state as the 
authority structure created an expectation that the state should protect individuals from these new 
market forces in the form of social policy legislation.   
Respective of these assertions, it is plausible that a conviction in the precedence of local 
poor laws was maintained through a preference for particular types of subnational state-level and 
federal-level social policy legislation.  In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam states the 
following about societal influences: 
“The conception of institutional performance in this study rests on the very simple 
model of governance:  societal demands ? political interaction ? government ? 
policy choice ? implementation.  Government institutions receive inputs from 
their social environment and produce outputs to respond to that environment.”
18
 
 
Putnam also stipulates that history shapes institutions and that institutions shape politics.  
Therefore, Putnam (and perhaps others) makes it plausible to argue that local poor laws created a 
durable cultural belief in the role of welfare that currently exists in many states today.  The 
median voter may have held on to the belief that targeted or occupationally dependent welfare 
was an appropriate insurance against the market because – like those standards embedded in 
local poor laws – able-bodied individuals should work to take care of themselves.  If this theory 
is upheld, the states with more representative institutions should be correlated to targeted or 
occupationally dependent welfare policies.  Conversely, other theoretical undertakings link 
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individual preferences, group preferences or representative institutions to larger forms of the 
welfare state.  In order to discuss how this state-centered explanation of the diversity in welfare 
states fits in with other comparative studies, an evaluation of these other theoretical explanations 
is essential. 
Theoretical Justifications for the Diverse Forms of the Welfare State 
Most of the research that attempts to explicate the causes of diversity in welfare state 
emergence and growth focuses on three levels of analyses: individual preferences, aggregate 
group preferences and state-level factors.  Many previous economic approaches to welfare state 
research have focused on individual-level justifications for supporting social policies. This 
previous literature often analyzes support for the welfare state in terms of individual rationality 
or the utility derived from it for an individual, i.e. social solidarity (altruism) or individual risk 
assessment.  Theoretically, individuals may support the welfare state because their utility 
increases when others’ utilities increase or when that individual has lower and/or more insecure 
forms of income. If an individual’s income is low or insecure, he may be more risk averse and, 
therefore prefer social insurance against the risk of unemployment.   
According to the risk aversion literature, at the extremes, if everyone in the society faces 
no risk then there will be no insurance; if everyone faces high risk then everyone will want 
insurance and this preference may be translated into legislation.
19
  However, under this theory, 
voluntary insurance will collapse when some face high risk and some face no risk.
20
  In addition, 
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some states have a larger majority of lower income individuals, but also have little to no welfare 
state; thus the risk aversion literature is not empirically supported. 
F. A. Hayek offers a poignant critique of individual-level approaches to studying the 
economy and welfare. Hayek avers the following: 
“To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in 
which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists [or social 
scientists] is to assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is 
important and significant in the real world.”
21
  
 
Risk aversion theories assume that individuals are capable of calculating their risk and, thereby, 
know whether or not they should support insurance policies, yet individuals have imperfect 
knowledge of their situations.  Furthermore, even if individuals had perfect knowledge to assess 
their risk, risk aversion theories must eventually discuss state intervention instead of assuming 
the translation of individual interests into legislation.  Certain institutional features such as 
federalism and more levels within the federal government may be more conducive for 
representing the interests of the median voter and decreasing the state’s autonomy.  Conversely, 
a higher degree of state autonomy may impede the translation of individual interests into 
legislation.  
Aggregate-level analyses of the welfare state contain a parallel theoretical concern.  They 
often assume that capital owners are pro-market and oppose the welfare state and that the 
working class is pro-welfare.  Within most of the literature, social policies are seen as an attempt 
at risk management for individuals or groups against the commodification of the market, which 
may hinder business profits and economic growth.  The varieties of capitalism literature is 
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usually cited as one major exception; it claims that some businesses prefer welfare policies in 
order to transfer some of the cost to other businesses.  Isabela Mares explains: 
“Social policies can offer distinct institutional advantages to employers and [there 
are identifiable] … conditions under which the benefits provided by social policy 
outweigh the costs of social policy to firms…. [T] he incidence of risk will 
generate significant cleavages among employers, between firms who gain from 
highly redistributive social policies and firms who lose from the participation in a 
broad pool of risks.”
22
   
 
Mares concludes that the skill level of the employees, whether firm-specific, industry, or general 
labor, determines the businesses’ preference for social policy.  However, the implication behind 
the varieties of capitalism literature is that firm-specific skilled workers will demand high 
employment protection from employers and these employers will then request that the cost of 
this insurance be spread across businesses in order to transfer some of their burden to other 
industries.  Ergo, the varieties of capitalism theory still presupposes that businesses resist the 
welfare state unless swayed by individual-level employee pressure and, similar to the risk 
aversion theory, this employee pressure is present when individuals assess their employment 
security. 
A large amount of aggregate-level welfare state analyses focus on the power or ability of 
the left to influence the size of the welfare state.  Power resource theorists (PRT) posit that 
industrialization is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the materialization of the welfare 
state.  Social policies require the presence of capitalism, industrialization and power in the hands 
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of a mobilized working class.
23,24
  A problematic aspect in the PRT literature is that the power of 
the working class is described as a zero-sum game instead of a nonlinear or relational measure 
between socialists and conservatives.
25
  Most of the PRT literature assumes that capital owners 
are pro-market yet they do not measure working class strength in relation to the strength of 
business. 
Accordingly, a major critique of the power resource theory is that it assumes that the 
power of the working class will be rendered into policy through representative government.  This 
critique is also linked to studies that evaluate the effect of trade openness on the size of the 
welfare state.  Most studies that focus on trade openness hypothesize that more open economies 
produce larger welfare states.  Dani Rodrik emphasizes the effect of trade openness on the size of 
the government overall.  Rodrik states, “There is a positive and robust partial correlation between 
openness, as measured by the share of trade in GDP, and the scope of government, as measured 
by the share of government expenditure in GDP.”
26
  He also asserts that this relationship exists 
because open economies incur more external risk and governments respond by establishing a 
safety net in the form of welfare expenditure:  “[I]n advance countries with social welfare 
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programs in place, it should be primarily spending on social security and welfare that is 
correlated with exposure to external risk … [and] [t]hat is indeed what we find.”
27
  
Nevertheless, the link between trade openness and social policy legislation must first 
acknowledge how trade openness effects employment and the pressure of the left for social 
policy legislation.  Rodrik states that “external risk” is an indicator of welfare expenditure 
because larger governments perform an “insulation function.”
28
  However, he negates that the 
government must have substantial domestic support for higher levels of welfare expenditure.  
Greater trade openness may incur domestic level issues with unemployment that will increase 
support for a greater welfare effort through unions or the left powers.  Therefore, studies on the 
effects of trade openness are really addressing a factor that might increase support for welfare 
expenditure yet – like the PRT literature – this approach negates the relative power of groups 
within society and the institutional inhibitors that may be present in the government. 
“State-centered” approaches to the origin of the welfare state have transpired from this 
critique.  State-centered explanations suggest that the state may not be able to translate support 
for social policies into actual legislation and that depending on the autonomy of the state; it may 
have preferences outside of that of the people.  In other words, the state will seek to survive 
through its own independent abilities.  Theda Skocpol stipulates, “States conceived as 
organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that 
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are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society.”
29
  The 
left cannot be assumed to have the autonomy or capacity to implement reforms without 
considering the structure of the state and the policy-making involvement of bureaucrats.  
The state-centered or institutional approach is the basis for the theory of the variations in 
the welfare state for this study, yet this study is not completely irreconcilable with the logic of 
industrialism or power resource theories.  Economic development and relational working class 
strength may be necessary but are not sufficient conditions for the differences that are now 
obvious across welfare states because the governmental institutional design of each state can still 
impede or facilitate the implementation of social reforms.  Hicks and Swank stipulate the 
following concerning the impact of left parties, unions and state structures: 
“Social democratic corporatism, conceived in terms of the degree to which left 
parties and unions mobilize and incorporate industrial workers into national 
policymaking networks, appears, net of short-run partisan politics, to be a strong 
source of national differences in welfare effort.  In addition, structurally 
centralized states with histories of early consolidation of major social security 
programs do, indeed, appear to capacitate national welfare effort ….”
30
 
 
The analysis by Hicks and Swank gives a well-formed basis for approaching institutional effects, 
yet their study also focuses on less structure related factors such as voter turnout and they 
operationalize the welfare state solely in terms of welfare expenditure.  To examine the effects of 
institutions on welfare spending, it is imperative that constitutional engineers concentrate on 
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those aspects that are controlled by state builders.  In addition, the welfare state should not be 
measured solely by the amount of money spent on it. 
Many theorists postulate that societies have arisen that may largely abide by their 
embedded beliefs and subsequent pressures regarding what policies will be implemented within 
the state.  However, societies are not homogeneous in their beliefs about social policies and the 
power to implement policy must be studied in relation to other factors within society.  States are 
actors that may have their own goals to pursue.  Therefore, individual and aggregate-level 
analyses often negate the impact of the relative power of groups, the groups who oppose welfare 
legislation and the institutions that must translate this power into legislation.  Institutional 
approaches to the study of welfare state emergence and growth predominantly seek to elucidate 
the effects of state structures such as federalism, bicameralism, an independent executive, and 
the make up of the legislature.  This method allows for a cross-national examination of 
industrialized as well as less developed democracies.  For this investigation, 32 states have been 
delineated from Arend Lijphart’s original dataset and unlike Lijphart, the smaller ones and the 
ones with less history as democracies are not completely dropped from the study.
31
 
 Many researchers have studied how institutional characteristics affect the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the state.
32
 The basic design of most state-centered approaches, including this 
study, is to acknowledge an exogenous demand by a group, then find a way to measure the 
constraints of government through its institutional features and compare the number and/or type 
of constraint to some measure of the welfare state.  Embedded in this approach is the belief that 
certain institutional structures are more representative of the society while others manifest more 
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state autonomy in legislative decisions.  However, there is a lot of deliberation over whether 
good government is efficient with more state autonomy or inefficient with more representation.  
As Giovanni Sartori states, “inefficient government may be the best defense we have against bad 
government:  the less its effectiveness, the less harm.”
33
  Perhaps inefficient government is 
actually more representative and, at least in that sense, it is also more effective.  Arend Lijphart 
concedes, “ concentrating political power in the hands of a narrow majority can promote unified, 
decisive leadership and hence coherent policies and fast decision-making . . . but fast decisions 
are not necessarily wise decisions.”
34
  Nevertheless, Lijphart equates effectiveness with, among 
other variables, a larger welfare state.  In opposition, many other institutional approaches to the 
study of the welfare state have tried to decipher what institutional features are more 
representative and may have actually hindered the emergence of a more encompassing welfare 
state. 
Ellen Immergut’s study focused on veto points within the constitutional structure of 
countries.  She claims that a higher number of veto points inhibits the ability to pass initial 
welfare policies in certain states.  Immergut focuses on health policy making in Switzerland, 
France, and Sweden.  She hypothesizes:  
“Political decisions require agreement at several points along a chain of decisions 
made by representatives in different political arenas.  The fate of legislative 
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proposals, such as those for national health insurance, depends upon the number 
and location of opportunities for veto along this chain.”
35
  
 
Immergut’s analysis focuses on the number of potential veto points through three levels:  (1) the 
separation of executive and legislative power, (2) electoral results of the party system and (3) the 
existence of national popular referendums.  Immergut concludes that interests and actors are 
important, yet institutions play a calculated role in political strategy.
36
  If a state has a smaller 
number of veto points, there will be more state autonomy and political actors will have a greater 
ability to pass national health insurance programs.   
George Tsebelis built off of Immergut’s theory by developing a theory of “veto players” 
that compensated for partisan elements within the political system that might restrain policy 
implementation.  Tsebelis’ theory proposes three important elements that may add to the number 
of partisan veto players, as opposed to points, by designing a strategy for specifying (1) the 
number of players involved in the process, (2) the distance in preferences between the players 
who are required to agree and (3) the discrepancy in policy preferences within members of the 
same party (Tsebelis deems these three factors as the number, their congruence and their 
cohesion).
37
 Tsebelis defines a veto player as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement 
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(by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy.”
38
  His analysis focuses 
on the policy stability of a political system through institutional and partisan veto players.  The 
institutional veto players are only counted if they have a “formal” veto power.  Tsebelis points 
out that some bicameral legislatures only have “delaying veto power” and some presidential 
regimes – for example Venezuela, Haiti and Peru – do not have veto authority within the 
executive.  In addition, Tsebelis stipulates, “one can think of powerful interest groups as veto 
players, at least in the policy areas of their concern.”
39
  However, Tsebelis is only concerned 
with the difficulty of passing legislation; he does not discuss specific types of legislation that 
might first be proposed.  Primarily, Tsebelis focuses on policy stability or the amount of change 
possible in the structure of budgets.
40
 
As is the custom for most institutional studies, Immergut assumes that all three countries 
in her study would seek to pass programs that increased the state’s role; for her study, that 
program was national health insurance.  Any institutional approach to studying the emergence of 
the welfare state should offer an in-depth theory regarding the assumed preferences of 
individuals and representatives.  Thus, Immergut’s theory should have addressed why the state 
would seek to pass national health insurance programs.  Moreover, neither Immergut nor 
Tsebelis offer a comprehensive way to measure their institutional features.  Immergut’s 
institutional variables are measured on a very small scale and Tsebelis’ theory does not elaborate 
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on degrees of bicameralism or executive power.  Arend Lijphart’s study in Patterns of 
Democracy focused on many possible repercussions from the constitutional structure of a state 
and he gave more specific and in-depth measures for many of his institutional variables.  As 
opposed to Immergut’s theory, Lijphart’s goal is to decipher whether or not more representation 
in government through institutional features actually produces better government in the form of a 
“kinder, gentler” democracy with a larger welfare state.   
Lijphart differentiated between the electoral-parties and federal-unitary dimensions 
within democracies that enabled the categorization of states under either the majoritarian or the 
consensus model.  While these features create ideal types, they are important for the purposes of 
constitutional engineering.  Lijphart uses these institutional attributes to classify states across two 
dimensions and then tests to see if the consensus features are positively correlated to better 
results such as economic success, civil peace and a “kinder, gentler” democracy.   
Each characteristic is aggregated and then plotted on a two dimensional “conceptual 
map” from -2 to 2 and -3 to 2 between majoritarian and consensus aspects.  The consensus 
executive-parties dimension includes executive power-sharing in multi-party cabinets, executive-
legislative balance of power, multiparty systems, and coordinated, “corporatist” interest groups.  
The consensus federal-unitary dimension focuses on federalism, strong bicameralism, rigid 
constitutions, judicial review by a constitutional court, and independent central banks.
41
  Lijphart 
contends the following concerning the kinder-gentler qualities of consensus democracies: 
“[C]onsensus democracies demonstrate ...  kinder, gentler qualities in the 
following ways:  they are more likely to be welfare states; they have a better 
record with regard to the protection of the environment; they put fewer people in 
prison and are less likely to use the death penalty; and the consensus democracies 
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in the developed world are more generous with their economic assistance to the 
developing nations.”
42
   
 
He uses a bivariate regression analysis to test the correlation between his executive-parties 
dimension score for each country and three measures of the welfare state including Esping-
Anderson’s de-commodification index, an adjusted de-commodification index and social 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
The de-commodification index was created by Esping-Anderson in order to try to 
quantify the qualitative attributes of the welfare state as well as quantitative characteristics such 
as the population covered.  As defined by Esping-Anderson, de-commodification is a measure of 
“the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market participation.”
43
  The combined de-commodification index, which 
comprises sickness, pensions, and unemployment programs, is measured on a scale from 13 to 
39.1 with a mean of 27.2.
44
   
The de-commodification index has been highly criticized for underestimating the welfare 
states of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
45
  By dropping these three cases, 
Lijphart created an adjusted index from Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification rankings.  
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Lijphart analyzed this adjusted index with his classification of 15 OECD states along the 
executive-parties dimension.  He found a significant relationship between consensus 
democracies and all three measures of the welfare state:  social expenditure, the de-
commodification index and the adjusted de-commodification index.  Lijphart reports that the 
relationship is only slightly weakened by the adjusted de-commodification index and the 
correlation is still statistically significant at the .05 level.
46
   
From these results, Lijphart insinuates that it is more likely for a consensus democracy to 
have a socialist or highly de-commodified welfare state.  He claims that consensus democracies 
are more representative and egalitarian.  Yet Lijphart’s study correlates representation with a 
larger welfare state when, in actuality, he is only focused on better representation in a vertical 
measure of institutions through the executive-parties dimension.  Also, his argument that better 
representation creates a larger welfare state assumes that individuals prefer a larger welfare state.  
In consideration of most state-centered approaches, Lijphart’s argument is counterintuitive. His 
assumption is actually the inverse of Immergut’s postulation.  If Lijphart is correct and 
individuals prefer a larger welfare state, then, regardless of representation, the state should 
implement more encompassing welfare legislation unless for some reason the state’s preference 
is to stifle state intervention.  However, as Immergut and Skocpol would contend, the state seeks 
to survive and perpetuate itself as an actor.  As a result, the state should prefer a larger role in 
welfare. 
If Lijphart had looked at each of the consensus characteristics in both the federal-unitary 
and the executive-parties dimensions, he may not have found a positive correlation between 
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consensus democracies and higher levels of de-commodification and social expenditure.  The 
federal-unitary dimension may have a greater effect on the emergence and expansion of the 
welfare state than the executive-parties dimension features.  Markus Crepaz asserts,  
“Institutional structures made up of collective veto points tend to drive up welfare 
expenditures in a statistically significant way.  In contrast, constitutions with 
competitive veto points, such as symmetrical legislatures (equal power between 
the two houses) and federalism (strong autonomy of substate regions from the 
central state), display depressing effects on welfare expenditures.”
47
   
 
Similarly, Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank maintain the following about the effects of 
majoritarian and consensus characteristics on the emergence of the welfare state: 
“The welfare implications of the majoritarian/consensus dimension for welfare 
effort are indeterminate ... majoritarian extremes may notably facilitate partisan 
enactment of distinctive policy goals … [but] their characteristically two-party 
forms promote “Downsian” platform convergence.  Moreover, consensus systems 
may arise in political contexts that legitimize – indeed, foster – redistributive 
policies.”
48
 
 
Hicks and Swank may be accurate; the distinction between majoritarian or consensus 
characteristics may actually have varying effects.  For instance, if representation is considered to 
be an impediment to social policy reform, then a multi-party system should be a hindrance as are 
federalism and checks.  However, if Downsian platform convergence is present, two-party 
systems may force representatives to come more towards the middle on their policy preferences.  
The proposal of more encompassing social policies may be more likely in a multi-party system 
that better represents that portion of the population who supports larger welfare state initiatives.  
The main question concerning the impact of the party and electoral system is whether or not a 
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fractionalized legislature increases the representation of the median voter’s preferences or offers 
an opening for less represented individuals whom might prefer more inclusive social policies.  It 
is possible that the vertical and horizontal institutional features actually have ambiguous effects.   
However, as with most institutional studies and contrary to Lijphart’s analysis, this inquiry 
presumes that greater representation actually fosters less efficient policy implementation.  
Greater representation of the median voter’s preferences through federalism, checks and 
fractionalization may result in less inclusive welfare legislation.  The primary argument is that 
federalism and checks, while largely excluded by Lijphart, play a substantial role in social policy 
legislation.  Hence, Lijphart’s analysis fails to examine key institutional variables that may 
encumber the emergence of the welfare state.  Also, Lijphart’s analysis does not control for vital 
variables such as the level of economic development or the power of the left within society.  
Therefore, his finding that consensus executive-parties features are more conducive for a larger 
welfare state is equivocal.  Conceivably, if Lijphart had controlled for these pertinent aspects and 
included the federal-unitary characteristics, his assessment may have had different results.  He 
may have found that more representation through a larger number of parties within the 
legislature, bicameralism, an independent executive and federalism actually decreases the 
likelihood of a more encompassing welfare state.  The two studies by Crepaz and Hicks and 
Swank support this argument.  However, both analyses focus solely on 18 OECD countries and 
measure the welfare state through the amount of social expenditure.  This study hypothesizes the 
following concerning the institutional effects that have allowed or impeded more encompassing 
welfare state emergence and growth: 
(H1):  Predominantly, states with a higher degree of autonomy through their 
institutional structures are better able to increase and sustain their role in welfare 
by passing more encompassing legislation (perhaps) in spite of the initial level of 
domestic support.  
 29
 
(H2):  States with a higher degree of median voter representation were and still 
are hindered in their ability to pass more encompassing social policies because the 
median voter will prefer targeted or occupationally dependent welfare policies 
unless the institutions have the autonomy to shape culture around larger reforms.  
Greater fractionalization within the legislature, strong federalism and a higher 
number of checks may increase representation of the median voter’s interest and 
impede welfare emergence and growth. 
 
Admittedly, embedded in this argument is the supposition that the median voter will prefer 
occupationally dependent or targeted welfare policies and that this preference is better 
represented in countries with more federalism and checks.  Much of the rational choice literature 
tries to determine individual preferences based on a person’s level of risk aversion, job skills, or 
beliefs in social solidarity.  However, historically, local poor relief was directed only at the most 
destitute of individuals, suggesting that the values concerning the local community’s role in 
welfare were still the prominent belief embedded in societies until industrialization incurred a 
transition to the idea that the state should play a greater role in securing individual welfare.  As 
previously mentioned, the English Poor Law of 1601, which supported targeted social policies 
on the local level, was used as a starting block for welfare policy preferences in many states.  As 
supporting evidence, even Sweden, which today has a socialist welfare regime containing many 
universal policies, initially passed targeted welfare reforms.
49
  It was not until the 1930’s that the 
Social Democrats gained the autonomy necessary within the legislature to begin passing more 
encompassing reforms to Sweden’s welfare state.  As previously stated by Putnam, “institutions 
are shaped by history.”
50
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This historical precedence is also recognizable through the welfare state as an institution 
shaped by the beliefs embedded in previous local poor laws.  States that have passed more 
universal welfare legislation may first need to acquire the autonomy to do so regardless of the 
wishes of the majority of society and the preference of powerful elites or business owners.  From 
this perspective, the less representative constitutional structures in government have fostered the 
autonomy necessary to shape societal beliefs around the universal welfare state and, in some 
cases, the corporatist welfare state.  This contention is associated with the concept that 
institutions have the power to shape culture.  However, more representative structures may have 
created occupational or targeted welfare policies simply because the government representatives 
did not have the autonomy necessary to shape culture around the support for larger social policy 
reforms.  
Most welfare state studies focus on one of three things: (1) the emergence of the welfare 
state in the early 1900s, (2) the expansion of the welfare state from 1945 to 1970 or (3) the 
retrenchment of social policies after the 1970s.  The following section will briefly discuss 
globalization and the alleged retrenchment literature and explain why these studies do not affect 
an institutional approach to the emergence of the welfare state.  Regardless of the ostensible 
retrenchment of the welfare state, the institutional effects on the emergence and growth of the 
welfare state should be approachable from an analysis that focuses on the present size of the 
welfare state.   
Globalization and the Retrenchment of the Welfare State 
 The existence of any globalization affects on the welfare state or retrenchment of the 
welfare state is heavily debated.  The basic idea behind the retrenchment literature is that 
increases in globalization – usually operationalized through trade openness and/or capital 
 31
mobility – were the casual mechanisms behind the retrenchment policies of the right in the 
1970s. However, Torben Iverson and Thomas Cusack find that globalization does not matter.  
They hypothesize that the de-industrialization of the work force created a domestic pressure for 
retrenchment policies.
 
 Iverson and Cusack assert the following: “there are reasons to expect that 
deindustrialization will be associated with increasingly distinct partisan effects.”
 51
 Similarly, 
Duane Swank asserts that the institutional design of a state may determine the level of 
retrenchment in social policies.  According to Swank, (given globalization) states with liberal 
welfare policies will face a greater degree of retrenchment because the median voter does not 
receive or support social policies to the same extent as median voters in universal or conservative 
welfare regimes.  However, under Swank’s theory, globalization does not matter.  He is 
stipulating simply that liberal welfare regimes have a higher probability for retrenchment. 
Geoffrey Garrett builds upon Iverson and Cusack’s work by analyzing partisan effects on 
retrenchment.  Garrett’s study attends to the role of left wing governments and the alleged 
weakening of organized labor movements on retrenchment.  He hypothesizes that globalization 
strengthens domestic government because it increases social risk.  In his analysis, globalization 
is viewed as a modifying factor between the left, labor power and social policies.  Unlike the 
conventional wisdom of the globalization literature, Garrett states, “Globalization increases the 
political payoffs for governments in these systems to compensate those whose economic 
insecurity increased with greater competition in international markets.”
52
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Correspondingly, Paul Pierson states the following in regards to the globalization effects 
on the welfare state: 
“[W]hile welfare states indeed face unprecedented budgetary stress, it seems 
likely that this stress is primarily related to a series of ‘post-industrial’ changes 
occurring within advanced industrial democracies themselves, as the employment 
profiles of affluent societies have become increasingly service-based, as their 
welfare states have matured, as populations have aged, and as radical changes in 
household structures have taken place.”
53
  
 
Contrary to Garrett, Pierson finds that there have been some qualitative cuts in policies, yet 
Pierson asserts that the type and degree of social policy cuts is negligible: 
 “Many programs have experienced a tightening of eligibility rules or reductions 
in benefits.  On occasion, individual programs (such as public housing in Britain) 
have undergone more radical reform.... Over the span of two decades, however, 
some changes in social policy are inevitable; even in the boom years of the 1960s 
specific social programs sometimes fared poorly.”
54
   
 
Similarly to Garrett, Pierson finds that, quantitatively, financial welfare state support has actually 
increased.  He contends that there is a difference between the restructuring and retrenchment of 
social policies.
55
  Pierson’s analysis addresses an important point also acknowledged in the state-
centered approaches.  As Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta assert, “social policies, once 
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enacted and implemented, themselves transform politics.”
56
  While the right may have pushed 
for and even achieved incremental levels of “retrenchment” or restructuring, if the welfare state 
is mature there will be broader popular support for social policies in comparison to the support 
present before the emergence of the welfare state.  Consequently, politicians could not and can 
not politically afford to execute real levels of retrenchment.
57
   
Additionally, Pierson points out that governments are actually getting bigger and not 
smaller.  In order for retrenchment to be a valid concern, quantitative drawbacks should be 
evident, yet governments are increasing their welfare expenditure.
58
  Therefore, for the purpose 
of this analysis, it is assumed that once welfare policies have been implemented it is difficult for 
any system to cut back on the program.  Any institutional effects on the emergence of the welfare 
state should also be present in any current measure of the welfare state.  In order to evaluate 
whether federalism, checks and (perhaps) fractionalization within the legislature may have 
increased representation but decreased the ability to pass more encompassing social policy 
legislation, current measures of these institutional features and of the welfare state will be 
evaluated through a cross-national analysis. This analysis will offer a varied sample of cases 
instead of focusing solely on the 18 OECD countries normally included in the welfare state 
literature.  I will use a similar case selection as the one included in Lijphart’s study.  Lijphart’s 
analysis included 36 countries, while this analysis contains the following 32 countries: Australia, 
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, 
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France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.
59
 
This study will evaluate the welfare states across these countries through three different 
measures.  First, I will focus on the 1990 de-commodification index and the adjusted de-
commodification index.  However, these two variables only include 15 and 18 countries, 
respectively.
60
  Therefore, the amount of welfare expenditure will be used in order to increase the 
sample size to the full 32 countries.  Since there is little evidence that retrenchment of the 
welfare state has (at least quantitatively) occurred, an average of social expenditure, expressed as 
a percent of GDP, across the most recent 28 years available (1972-2000) in the IMF World 
Development Indicators Database will be used as a relevant measure of the welfare state.  The 
following section will outline the methods and variables used in the analyses to elucidate the 
validity of and problems embedded in this study. 
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VARIABLES AND METHODS 
 Arend Lijphart’s study in Patterns of Democracy stipulated that consensus democracies 
increase representation and produce a larger welfare state.  However, when he was evaluating the 
“kinder, gentler” factors such as the size of the welfare state, he dropped the federal-unitary 
dimension and analyzed the executive-parties dimension against three measures of the welfare 
state:  the de-commodification index, the adjusted de-commodification index and social 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
 The following sections will discuss (1) the possible measures for the welfare state, (2) the 
relevant institutional impediments to the welfare state, (3) the important control variables left out 
of Lijphart’s study and (4) an approach to deciphering the institutional effects on the emergence 
and growth of the welfare state.  
First, I will reevaluate and re-run Lijphart’s bivariate regression of the executive-parties 
dimension.  His original analysis included the executive-parties dimension (EPDIM)
61
 regressed 
with the three measures of the welfare state: the de-commodification index (DECOM), the 
adjusted de-commodification index (ADECOM) and social expenditure as a percent of GDP 
(ALEXP).
62
  The original analysis will be compared to the updated executive-parties index 
(EXPAR), which compensates for the critique of Lijphart’s effective number of parties variable, 
regressed with the same three indicators of the size of the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM and 
ALEXP). 
Second, I will evaluate the effects of the federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN) 
originally dropped from Lijphart’s analysis.  I will discuss the results from a bivariate analysis of 
                                                
61
 The original executive-parties dimension index (EPDIM) was created by combining the five 
consensus institutional features and scaling them from -2 to 2. 
 
62
 Lijphart pulls ALEXP from Schmidt, Manfred G. (1997). 
 36
FEDERUN with the three indicators of the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM and ALEXP).  
These results should be similar to what Lijphart would have found if he had reported his original 
results.  Third, using a cross sectional multivariate analysis, the same 15 to 18 countries in 
Lijphart’s analysis (respectively) will be used to distinguish the effects of fractionalization within 
the legislature (FRAC), checks within the system (BICHECK) and the level of federalism 
(IFEDER) on the de-commodifying capacity of the welfare state (DECOM and ADECOM) 
while controlling for the countries level of economic development (GDPPPP) and union 
coordinated bargaining strength (WCOORD). 
Finally, my analysis will review all 32 countries in this study through a cross sectional 
multivariate regression of the effects of fractionalization (FRAC), checks (BICHECK) and 
federalism (IFEDER) on the amount of social expenditure (SOCSEC) while controlling for 
economic development (GDPPPP) and interest group corporatism (INTER2).  What follows is 
an overview of the dependent, independent and control variables included in each of the 
analyses.   
The Welfare State as a Dependent Variable 
When welfare states are classified under Bismarckian (occupational) or Beveridgean 
(universal) types, researchers usually end up dividing them into more specific categories because 
this original bimodal classification only addresses the delivery of the provisions; it does not 
operationalize the welfare state in a measurable manner so that the quantity of the benefits or 
how well the benefits are redistributed throughout society can be compared across states.  This 
problem is largely due to the existence of mixed systems.  Many countries, including 
 37
Switzerland, Italy and Canada, have both occupational and universal social policies.
63
  
Classifying welfare states according to these qualitative attributes, but negating their mixed 
structures is problematic when trying to compile a comparative measure of the welfare state. 
Like this study, many researchers use the amount of a state’s social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP to try to establish a quantitative value for a state’s welfare system.  Some 
studies focus solely on this measure while others, like that of Giuliano Bonoli, attempt to capture 
both the qualitative and quantitative attributes of the welfare state.  Bonoli created a four-part 
model by classifying welfare states into Beveridgean high-spending, Beveridgean low-spending, 
Bismarckian high-spending and Bismarckian low-spending systems.
64
  Bonoli states, “Ideally, a 
classification should be able to capture both dimensions – the quantity of welfare provision and 
the way in which this provision is delivered.”
65
  However, Bonoli’s classification fails to explain 
the product of these redistributing policies within the society.  He may include a measure for the 
amount of government expenditure and a classification for the type of system, but he does not 
include a way to measure the effect of these policies at the domestic level.   In addition, all social 
spending should not be counted equally because some welfare states, like the Austrian one, have 
a large expenditure of benefits directed toward civil servants.
66
  Bonoli’s classification is also 
problematic because it is only useful in a qualitative analysis unless these distinctions are scaled.  
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However, a one to four scale cannot possibly capture the varied forms of the welfare state and 
any scale based on social expenditure is no better than relying solely on the social expenditure 
itself. 
Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index (DECOM) is often used as a dependent 
variable when studying the welfare state.  The de-commodification index was created in a multi-
step process that evaluated pension, sickness and unemployment programs and then combined 
them to create one single number for each state’s welfare provisions.
67
  For pensions, Esping-
Anderson created the index in the following manner: 
(1) The replacement rate: minimum pension benefit divided by the normal worker 
earnings and multiplied by two for weighting purposes 
(2) The replacement rate: standard pension benefits divided by the normal worker 
earnings and multiplied by two for weighting purposes 
(3) The contribution period:  the years required for standard benefits, scored 
inversely 
(4) The individual’s share of pension financing 
(5) Steps 1-4 scaled from 1-3 using one standard deviation from the mean:  1=low 
de-commodification, 2=medium, 3=low de-commodification 
(6) Weighted by the relevant population covered 
(7) Step 3 scored 0 and step 6 scored .50 for means-tested programs
68
 
 
The pension measure created a scale from 5 to 17 for what Esping-Anderson deems the “degree 
of de-commodification.”
69
  For sickness and unemployment, Esping-Anderson created the index 
in the subsequent way: 
(1) “The benefit replacement rate (net) for a standard worker during the first 26 
weeks of sickness or unemployment” and multiplied by two for weighting 
purposes 
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(2) The employment time required to receive benefits (weeks) 
(3) The number of waiting days before benefits are paid to individual 
(4) The number of weeks that the benefits will be maintained 
(5) Steps 1-4 scaled from 1-3 using one standard deviation from the mean 
(6) Weighted by the population covered as a percent of the labor force 
(7) Step 6 scored .5 for means-tested programs.
70
 
 
The sickness index culminates in a scale from 0 to 15 and the unemployment scale is 
from 4 to 11.1.
71
  However, Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index is greatly criticized 
due to its subjective nature.  The combined de-commodification index does not include health 
insurance or education programs; he only merged scores according to pension programs, 
unemployment and sickness benefits.  Also, while Esping-Anderson’s theory behind the de-
commodification index is extensively discussed as a way to figure an individual’s ability to 
survive outside of participation in the market, he does not specify a theory behind his 
measurement procedures.  One variable, pensions, is weighted double that of unemployment or 
sickness benefits but he does not discuss why he emphasized pension programs over the other 
two types of programs.  Consequently, the de-commodification index has been highly criticized.  
This is especially true for the welfare states of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
It is often stipulated that the de-commodification scores for these three states underestimates the 
size of each country’s welfare state.
72
  Also, the de-commodification index is only available for 
18 OECD countries, so the sample size needs to be expanded. 
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Esping-Anderson cites the SSIB data files for his source of the de-commodification index 
measures, yet the SSIB files are not publicly available.  As an attempt to rectify this problem, the 
de-commodification index should be refigured with publicly available data and it should 
incorporate a larger number of states.  However, compiling a comparable replacement rate is 
problematic.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) offers some useful measures to pull or 
create replacement rates.  First, the ILO gives a replacement rate defined as the average monthly 
benefit as a percent of average monthly earnings.  Unfortunately, it is only available for 10 
relevant countries when studying the 36 countries specified by Lijphart.
73
  Second, the ILO 
LABORSTA data files give the average hourly, weekly or monthly earnings for most countries, 
which might also be used to create a replacement rate.  However, not all countries have data 
available for each sector of employment.  Some of the data on wages is only given for certain 
sectors such as manufacturing or construction.  Therefore, it is difficult to be sure that the wages 
are an actual average wage for all the economic activities in the country.  Also, the wages are not 
consistently given by hour, week or month.  Some countries only have hourly wages listed, 
which then requires that the average hours worked in a week be used to figure a monthly salary 
to compare to other countries.
74
 Even if LABORSTA did have consistent data for all the 
necessary countries, the average, minimum or maximum benefits for pensions, sickness and 
unemployment benefits must also be acquired to construct a comparable replacement rate.   
The Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTTW) web site offers a 
qualitative description of the welfare programs in all thirty-six countries originally included in 
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this sample.  Unfortunately, building a comparable replacement rate using this source is also 
difficult.  Notably, the SSPTTW will articulate some measure to figure the replacement rate, but 
this measure is not the same across all states.  For example, the minimum monthly pension for 
Italy is given as ?412.18, but for Columbia the minimum social insurance pension is stated to be 
equal to the minimum wage.  Likewise, beginning in 2004 the SSPTTW states, “the pension is 
equal to between 55% and 65% of the basic monthly wage, plus 1.5% for every 50-week period 
of contributions up to a maximum of 80% of the basic monthly wage.”
75
 From this information 
and the LABORSTA wages data, Italy’s replacement rate can be figured as a minimum of 2%, 
yet Esping-Anderson classifies Italy under the conservative welfare regime so the replacement 
should be higher than 2%.  In addition, Columbia’s pension program can have a minimum 
replacement rate equal to the minimum wage divided by average monthly income (624,656 pesos 
according to LABORSTA) or the minimum replacement rate may be 55%.
76
  When these 
statistics are compared, it becomes apparent that evaluating the replacement rate from so many 
different sources and with so many different descriptions is problematic.
77
   
Some countries list only a minimum monthly pension while others give only a maximum 
monthly pension and still others actually list a replacement rate as a percentage of basic monthly 
earnings.  Furthermore, after trying to figure the replacement rate for these thirty-six countries, 
one can choose certain countries to try to compare the replacement rate figured through the 
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SSPTTW information to the replacement rate given by the ILO and the figures are not 
consistently equivalent.  For example, when trying to compare replacement rates across multiple 
sources for Spain, the manually figured minimum pension replacement rate from the SSPTTW 
and LABORSTA is equal to 20%, yet the ILO Social Protection data states that the average for 
Spain’s pension replacement rate in 1996 was 66.4%.
78,79
  While both of these measures could be 
correct, there is no way to know that the manually figured 20% is estimated correctly because the 
average monthly wages are figured for the available economic activities in the LABORSTA data 
and not for all economic activities.  Also, even if the data are figured correctly, it is not plausible 
to compare the minimum replacement rate of some countries to the average or maximum 
replacement rates of other countries. 
In consideration of the issues embedded in constructing a replacement rate, it is not 
surprising that so many welfare state studies have opted to use Esping-Anderson’s de-
commodification index.  However, there is one other measure that is also often used in the 
welfare state literature and this measure is available for many more countries.  Social 
expenditure (SOSSEC), expressed as a percent of GDP, tries to capture the size of the welfare 
state through the amount of money spent on it.  This measure is often critically assessed because 
the amount of money spent does not necessarily translate into an explanation of how well the 
money is allocated.  A country could have a higher social expenditure but not do so well in 
redistributing the money.  Also, as stated before, some countries spend more in certain areas such 
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as the civil service industry.  However, when Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index is 
compared to social expenditure, the relationship has a 70% correlation with significance at the 
.01 level.
80
   
Consequently, this analysis will analyze fractionalization, federalism and checks with all 
three measures of the welfare state:  the de-commodification index (DECOM), the adjusted de-
commodification index (ADECOM)
81
 and social expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC).  
To elucidate why fractionalization, checks and federalism are delineated as the pertinent 
institutional variables, the following section will address the precedent set by previous the 
institutional literature and the issues embedded in those studies. This study argues that 
fractionalization, federalism and checks are the pertinent variables to be evaluated when 
attempting to decipher the impact of institutions on social policy formation. 
Institutional Impediments to the Welfare State 
 Arend Lijphart hypothesized that consensus democracies would be more representative 
and therefore would produce, among other things, a more developed welfare state.  As 
previously stated, the consensus features were grouped under two dimensions: the executive-
parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension.  Lijphart demarcated these consensual 
institutional features in the following way: 
The Executive-Parties Dimension 
(1) Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets 
(2) Executive-legislative balance of power 
(3) Multiparty system 
(4) Proportional representation 
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(5) Interest group corporatism 
 
The Federal-Unitary Dimension 
(6) Federal and decentralized government 
(7) Strong bicameralism 
(8) Constitutional rigidity 
(9) Judicial review 
(10) Central bank independence
82
 
 
However, when trying to decipher the relevant institutional features that may have hindered the 
ability of representatives to pass more encompassing welfare reforms, it becomes apparent that 
many of Lijphart’s variables contrive either irrelevant, mis-measured or ad hoc explanations.   
 In the executive-parties dimension, the electoral system does not have a direct effect on 
legislative autonomy because it is actually the number of parties or, as Tsebelis points out, the 
ideological distance between those parties, that may hinder the autonomy of legislators.  
However, Lijphart measures the electoral system and the party system as two separate 
institutional variables when what he really needs to measure is the effect these systems have on 
the make-up of the legislature and the legislative-executive relationship.  
Lijphart measures the party system in a two step process:  (1) he uses Markku Laakso and 
Rein Taagepera’s equation for the effective number of parties  [N= 1/?si2]83 and then (2) he tries 
to compensate for closely allied parties and fractionalized parties by calculating the effective 
number of parties twice and then splitting the difference.
84
  Yet Lijphart’s effective number of 
parties measure is problematic.  For example, the United States is coded as having 2.4 parties.  
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Lijphart explains this coding as a representation of the fragmentation within the Democratic 
Party, yet the United States is predominantly considered to have a two-party system.  Due to this 
critique, Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension will be re-run to compensate for the effective 
number of parties measure he uses in the original analysis before the final two analyses are 
evaluated.  Lijphart’s executive-parties analysis will be re-evaluated and the effective number of 
parties variable will be adjusted to Laakso and Taagepera’s equation.   
To re-specify the pertinent variables for the final analyses, the rest of Lijphart’s 
executive-parties dimension will be reevaluated.  As for Lijphart’s measures of the electoral 
system, the real issue to gauge is not the type of system, but the number of parties the structures 
produce within the legislature.  Consequently, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) may 
offer a better variable to represent the possibility of partisan conflict or cooperation within the 
legislature.  The measure for fractionalization (FRAC) is defined as “[t]he probability that two 
deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties.”
85
   
While Lijphart hypothesizes that a larger number of parties under proportional 
representation will be more representative and thereby more effective for passing welfare 
legislation, it is actually hypothesized by many institutional scholars that fractionalization will be 
more representative but hinder efficiency in legislation.  As previously acknowledged, 
fractionalization could have varied effects.  Contrary to Lijphart’s findings, this study 
hypothesizes that a higher measure of fractionalization may increase the possibility of a veto and 
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impede more encompassing welfare legislation.
86
  In regard to Lijphart’s executive-parties 
dimension, a measure of fractionalization may actually be a better interpretation of the 
institutional effects of the electoral and party system and it will be used in the final two analyses.  
In addition, some of the other executive-party features differentiated by Lijphart are not 
necessarily linked as possible impediments to initial welfare state legislation. 
 Lijphart argued that interest group corporatism was a relevant institutional measure for 
the executive-parties dimension.  He states that more majoritarian democracies will have a free-
for-all competition between interest groups:  “[p]luralism [the inverse of corporatism] ... means a 
multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the government in an uncoordinated and 
competitive manner.”
87
 However, interest group corporatism is not an institutional variable 
contrived through state building.  Therefore, it will be addressed in the following control 
variables section.  Additionally, Lijphart’s “executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinets” 
and “executive-legislative balance of power” variables also need to be examined to determine 
whether or not they should be included as institutional variables in the executive-parties 
dimension.  These two variables may be better represented as a measure of the veto gates within 
the system.   
The DPI gives an in-depth measure that is scored incrementally for impeding factors such 
as an independent executive, whether the executive is elected competitively, if the opposition of 
the executive controls the legislature, for presidential systems with separate chambers in the 
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legislature and/or for parliamentary systems with multiple competing legislative parties.
88
  Thus, 
the DPI’s measure for checks accounts for what Lijphart calls executive power-sharing and 
executive-legislative balance of power and it will be used as a factor for the checks within the 
system (BICHECK).
89
 
 There are also some concerns regarding the validity of the features demarcated in 
Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension.  Because Lijphart fails to report his results on the bivariate 
regression of the federal-unitary dimension with the three indicators for the welfare state, this 
study will analyze the federal-unitary dimension index (FEDERUN) against all three measures of 
the welfare state originally used by Lijphart (DECOM, ADECOM and ALEXP).  However, these 
federal-unitary variables need to be examined to delineate their relevance for the final two 
analyses.   
The degree of central bank independence is not usually considered an institutional feature 
because it does not open a point of veto.  Lijphart stipulates, “When central banks are strong and 
independent, they play a critical role in the policy process.”
90
  Admittedly, central bank 
independence can hinder policy through the regulation of inflation and interest rates.  In addition, 
if unemployment is affected by the management of inflation through the central bank, then 
employment levels may play a role in domestic level pressures for increases or decreases in 
social policy.  However, this domestic level pressure should be noticeable in a measure for union 
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strength if it inhibits the government’s ability to pass more encompassing welfare legislation.  
Therefore, central bank independence will be considered a factor that might increase the power 
of the left.  To compensate for this issue, both interest group corporatism and wage bargaining 
scores will be addressed in the following control variables section. 
In addition, the existence of strong judicial review and/or constitutional rigidity may be in 
part categorized as institutional features, yet they rarely have an a priori role in legislation, ipso 
facto, any explanation based on these variables may be ad hoc.  A similar issue is present when 
addressing popular referenda.  While Lijphart dismisses public referenda, stating that it is not an 
institutional feature, Immergut stresses the hindrance that referenda can cause in social policy 
legislation.  Her main example, Switzerland, demonstrates that more encompassing forms of 
welfare legislation can be overturned by popular referenda.  She declares, “In Switzerland the 
constitutional right of voters to challenge legislation through referenda pulled decision-making 
into the electoral arena.... ”
91
  In addition, Immergut later emphasizes, “[I]t was in practice the 
referendum that constituted the critical veto point.”
92
  In spite of this, when studying referenda, 
Switzerland is an anomaly.  Its unique use of referendums is easily discernable when it is 
compared to the use of referendums in other countries.   
According to Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Switzerland used popular referenda over 
two hundred times from 1970 to 1997.  Consequently, Lane and Ersson stress that “only 
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Switzerland is a genuine referendum democracy.”
93
  Similarly, David Butler and Austin Ranney 
postulate: 
“In most [countries], [referenda] have been ad hoc affairs designed to solve a specific 
problem.  Half of the eight hundred or so referendums that have taken place at the 
national level in the history of the world have been in Switzerland, but the number of 
other countries in which they have played a continuous role in politics is very small.  On 
the whole, they have been crisis instruments, invoked to solve a particular problem or to 
justify a particular solution.”
94
 
 
Therefore, while the institutional feature of national popular referendum may be a valid inhibitor 
to the emergence of the welfare state in Switzerland, it is, on the whole, an ad hoc explanation 
that should be viewed as an anomaly.  Popular referenda and the existence of judicial review are 
extemporized variables; they should not be deemed as main institutional inhibitors to the 
emergence of the welfare state, and they will not be included in the analysis. 
 When evaluating the validity of other federal-unitary dimension features, federalism and 
bicameralism may increase representation and decrease the state’s autonomy in the legislative 
process which may hinder the emergence of the welfare state.  In Hicks and Swank’s study of 
political institutions and welfare spending, they suggest that state centralization will increase 
welfare spending.  They assert the following: 
“[C]entralized, unitary government reduces veto points for the obstruction of pro-
welfare reforms and streamlines political instruments for the enactment of such 
reforms.  On the assumption that national political organizations can exert more 
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pro-welfare pressure on national policy than dispersed actors in subnational 
arenas, these aspects of centralization should augment welfare effort.”
95
 
 
As stated by Hicks and Swank, “quantitative studies have frequently risked unstable findings by 
using coarse measures and minute samples,” yet they also only focus on 18 industrialized 
democracies.
96
   
As a result, it is important to expand their sample and analyze fractionalization as well as 
federalism and checks to attempt a better understanding of the influences that these factors may 
have on social policy spending and implementation.  Chiefly, measures for federalism and 
bicameralism need to be evaluated.  Lijphart created a measure for federalism on a scale from 
one to five, yet the DPI has a slightly expanded measure of federalism, ranging from one to 
seven.  The DPI index for federalism (IFEDER) evaluates five issues:  (1) whether adjoining 
regions exist, (2) whether municipal governments are locally elected, (3) whether there are state 
or provincial governments that are locally elected, (4) whether the state or provincial 
governments have the authority to tax, spend or legislate and (5) whether the constituents of the 
senators are the states or provinces.
97
  This measure of federalism is an often-used variable for 
discerning a country’s level of federalism.
98
  Similarly, a measure for bicameralism can be 
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figured in two apposite ways.  As a separate variable, Lijphart’s index for bicameralism is an 
indicative measure.  Also, the previously described checks variable from the DPI accounts for 
bicameralism.  Still, bicameralism is a main indicator of checks within the system and should be 
treated as such.  In addition, as Tsebelis states, “there are countries where the upper chamber has 
only a delaying veto power.”
99
  Consequently, to avoid issues of multicollinearity and to allow 
for the different degrees of bicameralism within a state, Lijphart’s index of bicameralism and the 
DPI’s measure of checks can be combined into one index for the checks within the system 
(BICHECK).
100
  Federalism (IFEDER) and checks (BICHECK) will be used in the final two 
analyses as possible inhibitors to welfare state emergence and growth. 
It is hypothesized that higher levels of fractionalization, federalism and more checks or 
veto gates will increase representation yet decrease the ability of legislators to pass more 
encompassing forms of social policy.  Be that as it may, it should be recognized that Lijphart’s 
findings as well as Hicks and Swank’s postulation suggest that fractionalization may encourage 
the emergence of more encompassing welfare state legislation because of the lack of 
“Downsian” platform convergence.  It is possible that the median voters’ interests are better 
represented in two-party systems because multi-party systems allow for representation of as 
many people as possible instead the majority of the people.  Lijphart’s assessment does not 
elucidate this corollary because his regression dismisses the institutional federal-unitary 
characteristics and he does not control for the influence of the level of economic development 
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across states or the strength of the left to influence legislation.  In order to better evaluate the 
efficaciousness of institutions on translating median voter interests into desired social policy 
reforms, some control variables must be defined and explained. 
Control Variables 
Welfare state research commonly focuses on developed nations because, as it is often 
asserted, states are thought to require a certain level of economic development in order to 
implement social policies.  Adam Przeworski contends that poorer countries cannot afford a 
strong state because “[p]overty appears to leave no room for politics.”
101
  For this reason and 
because of problems with the availability of data, much of the welfare state literature focuses 
solely on OECD countries.  Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index addresses 18 OECD 
countries and those same countries are repeatedly used in the welfare state literature.  For 
example, Lijphart expands his analysis to 36 countries, yet he drops most of the cases in order to 
run his regressions.  When he regresses the executive-parties dimension against the de-
commodification index, his N falls to those 18 countries found in the de-commodification index.  
When he regresses the executive-parties dimension on the adjusted de-commodification index, 
his N is equal to 15 because he drops the 3 most disputed measures from the de-commodification 
index.  He also evaluates social expenditure as a percent of GDP, but his case size is still only 18.   
Focusing on OECD states offers a very small sample of countries with much too similar 
histories and levels of economic development.  A larger sample of 32 of Lijphart’s countries will 
be analyzed in this study in order give a more encompassing view of the comparative 
institutional effects on welfare state emergence.  In addition, in consideration of the impact that 
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the economic development of a country can have on the ability of the state to support social 
policies; the GDP will be used in the analyses as a control for each state’s economic 
development.  
The most common variable used by researchers to control for the level of economic 
development is the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) official exchange rate (OER) of the 
state.  The GDP, OER is a measure of the “value of all final goods and services produced within 
a nation in a given year” at the official exchange rate divided by the population of that nation.
102
 
However, using the GDP, OER has a few problems.  First, the GDP, OER exaggerates the 
difference between production power and consumption power because the exchange rate is not 
easily comparable in cross-national studies.  As stated in The World Factbook: 
“Official exchange rates, however, can be artificially fixed and/or subject to 
manipulation - resulting in claims of the country having an under- or over-valued 
currency - and are not necessarily the equivalent of a market-determined 
exchange rate.... [Also] GDP is not well suited to comparing domestic GDP over 
time, since appreciation/depreciation from one year to the next will make the 
OER GDP value rise/fall regardless of whether home-currency-denominated GDP 
changed.”
103
 
 
In the 1960s, the United Nations launched an international comparison project (ICP) and 
constructed an artificial international dollar for comparative evaluations of states.  This measure, 
GDP purchasing power parity (PPP), gives a better account of a state’s economic development or 
wealth and it will be used in the following analysis as a control (GDPPPP).
104
  Middle income 
countries show up at a similar ranking as measured by the GDP, OER measure, yet poorer 
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countries usually rank higher than when the exchange rate method is used instead of the GDP, 
PPP.
105
  Whenever states with varying levels of economic development are being compared in a 
cross-national analysis, the GDP, PPP should be used as a control variable. 
Additionally, institutional approaches to the study of the emergence of the welfare state 
should also try to control for variables mentioned in the previous literature.  As a relevant 
example, the PRT literature postulates that the power of the left in a given state has a direct 
correlation to the type of welfare state that emerges.  The power of left is operationalized in a 
number of ways throughout the PRT literature.  Bo Rothstein argues that the organization of the 
working class is extremely important therefore, he uses the degree of unionization as a proxy for 
working class strength.  He states, “it seems reasonable to conclude that institutional power in 
the administration of government labor-market institutions is important in determining union 
density or working class strength.”
106
  Similarly, Walter Korpi focuses on the degree of political 
mobilization in the working class.
107
  Most PRT studies focus on the percentage of seats held by 
the left or some measure of unionization to approximate a measure for the power of the left. The 
Comparative Welfare States Data Set pulls a measure for unionization from Lane Kenworthy 
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that creates a scale from one to five according to the level of wage coordination (WCOORD).
108
  
A score of five demarcates a state with the following description for unionization: 
“Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage 
schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union 
concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive 
coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive pattern-
setting.”
109
  
 
However, like much of the welfare state data, this measure is only available for 18 OECD states.   
As previously stated, Lijphart created a measure for interest group pluralism as one of his 
executive-parties institutional features that may be better suited as a way to control for the power 
of the left.
110
  Both WCOORD and INTER2 should incorporate the amount of pressure from the 
left whether it is caused by the ability to manipulate employment through increases in trade 
openness or central bank independence.  Intuitively, a state with a more pluralist arrangement 
may have a less coordinated level of unionization (INTER2).
111
  When a correlation is 
established between interest group corporatism (an inverse measure of the interest group 
pluralism index) and Kenworthy’s measure for wage coordination scores, the relationship is 
highly significant at the .01 level.  Interest group corporatism and wage coordination scores are 
correlated at seventy-four percent.  Therefore, when controlling for the power of the left in a 
regression with a larger sample size, the measure for interest group corporatism might be used as 
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a proxy for unionization.  Granted, the interest group index measures all interest groups and not 
just unionization.  Hence, interest group corporatism may be better suited as a control variable 
that represents the relative strength of different groups within society (pro-welfare and pro-
market interests alike).  A short case study example of the U.S. may serve to elucidate the 
pertinent variables for the cross sectional analysis. 
The United States:  An Historical Example 
The United States constitution was purposely engineered to contain a separation of 
powers throughout the system.  It is a government with political authority spread out through 
numerous branches inside and outside the federal government.  As Seymour Lipset and Gary 
Marks assert,  
“The Revolutionary Americans, having defeated a tyrannical king, feared the 
power of a unified, central state.  They sought to avoid tyranny by checks and 
balances, dividing power among different political bodies, all subject to a Bill of 
Rights limiting government authority.”
112
 
 
On a five-point scale, Lijphart codes the U.S. as a five, the most federal and decentralized 
ranking because power is divided between the individual states, the House of Representatives, 
the Senate, the Judiciary and the Presidency.  
The combined de-commodification score for the United States in 1990 was a 13.8 on a 
scale that ranges from 13 to 39.1.  This de-commodification score is a measure of how well the 
United States welfare system has sheltered labor from the market in relation to 17 other OECD 
countries.  A ranking of 13.8 places the U.S. in a cluster of states that Esping-Anderson calls 
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liberal welfare regimes because of their lack of effectively de-commodifying social policies.
113
  
Social expenditure from 1972 to 2000 averaged around 6.73 percent of the U.S.’s GDP.  In 
comparison to states such as Norway and Sweden, this amount of expenditure is only half that of 
some of the other industrialized democracies.  Even Germany, whose welfare state is normally 
considered to be a medium size, spends an average of 14.53 percent of the GDP on social 
policies.
114
  The 1990 de-commodification score and the yearly average of social spending in the 
United States are a reflection of the institutional obstacles that have stifled the federal legislation 
and continue to impede the U.S. from expanding their social policies. 
Lipset and Marks proclaim the following about the effects of federalism: 
“The effect of federalism for socialism is double-edged.  It weakened the state as 
an instrument of reform and denied to socialists the possibility of organizing 
against national exploitation.  Yet federalism also allowed socialists the 
possibility of electoral success and executive control in political units much 
smaller than the country as a whole.”
115
  
  
According to Lipset and Marks, this organizational weakness of the socialist party was not due to 
repression because many European socialist parties faced greater repression than that in the U.S.  
However, the socialist party in the U.S. was unwilling to align with the American Federation of 
Labor or incorporate immigrants.  Consequently, they faced organizational weakness and never 
became a viable party.  Lipset and Marks hypothesize that the lack of an electorally viable 
socialist party in U.S. produces an exceptional case study.  This phenomenon may be due – in 
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part – to the degree of power separation across the U.S.’s system of government.  Primarily, as 
Lipset and Marks concur, the greater degree of federalism may have dispersed the power of 
socialists thinly across a large country.
116
 
Before the 1930s, social welfare in the United States was the responsibility of the local 
and state governments.  Health insurance and unemployment insurance programs had been 
proposed by many states, but early on they both failed miserably. Health insurance in the United 
States never recovered from its first state-level crash and it is still almost non-existent on the 
federal level with a score of zero on Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index.  In 1916, 
Massachusetts failed in its attempt to address unemployment compensation, but by 1920 a few 
exceptionally large corporations had financially limited occupational welfare workers 
compensation programs in forty-three states.  Later, the states within the U.S. began playing an 
incrementally larger role in social policy reforms.  In the midst of the Great Depression in 1932, 
the Wisconsin Industrial Commission developed a series of preventative bills at the individual 
business level.  The businesses were required to establish an unemployment fund, but the fund 
only needed to be maintained at a minimal level; therefore, the benefits were stable but also low.  
A few months later, an Ohio commission proposed another type of unemployment compensation 
that included a statewide fund contributed to by employers and employees.  It was not until April 
of 1935 that New York became the first state to pass a bill for unemployment insurance instead 
of limited unemployment assistance.
117
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A similar uphill trend to that of unemployment insurance is found when exploring sub-
national origins of old-age pensions in the United States.  County-optional legislation was passed 
by six states in the late 1920s.  However, Pennsylvania’s law was found unconstitutional by 
judicial review and three other states failed to pay out the pensions.
118,119
  It was not until 1934 
that the subnational states really began implementing old-age pension policies.  Twenty-three 
states passed compulsory laws, and five states passed county-optional laws.
120
   
By the presidential election of 1932, many subnational states had passed some form of 
unemployment compensation or insurance and a compulsory or county-optional old-age pension 
program.  The United States was just over three years into the Great Depression when Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt was elected to office.  There is a lot of debate about whether FDR’s New Deal 
plan actually helped the U. S. emerge from the depression, but it is rarely disputed that the New 
Deal was the beginning of national welfare programs in the U. S.  The only federal program 
before the twentieth century initiatives was a pension system that allocated funds for war 
veterans.
121
  Roosevelt’s social policy goals were stacked against the historical precedent of sub-
national social policies in the form of occupationally dependent and targeted welfare.  As 
Finegold and Skocpol assert “[p]arties are constrained in their strategic choices by past strategies 
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and by governing responsibilities.”
122
  This constraint is present not just through parties but 
through government officials in general. 
Public support for federal welfare legislation may have been linked to the presence of 
sub-national state-level legislation.  Consequently, Roosevelt’s first campaign focused more on 
balancing the budget than on the introduction of encompassing reforms.  The first wave of the 
New Deal, called the “hundred days,” was an attempt at producing jobs without ruining the 
federal budget.  Two federal administrative agencies, the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) were created to adjust prices, 
production and employment levels. Both the AAA and the NRA met with limited success and 
within a few years they were declared unconstitutional by judicial review.
123
   
The passage of both the NRA and the AAA was partially dependent upon the party line.  
As is often the case in the United States two-party system, in the first hundred days, the 72
nd
 
Congress and the executive was split between parties.  Roosevelt held office in the executive, but 
the republicans had the majority in the House of Representatives with 218 seats out of a total of 
435, and the majority in the Senate with 48 seats out of a total of 96.
124,125
  This lack of 
autonomy throughout the legislative process may have added to the difficulty of expanding 
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social policies beyond targeted reforms.  Not only was Roosevelt faced with sub-national policy 
precedents, but he was also faced with a minority in the Senate and in the House.  
By 1935, the United States Congress had a Democratic Party majority in both houses at 
the same time that the executive position was controlled by a Democratic Party president.  
During the New Deal’s “second hundred days” the Wagner Act was passed.  The Wagner Act 
included the Social Security Act, which initiated the first federal pension plan in the United 
States.  However, Roosevelt and the 1935 Congress were careful to build the plan in a way that 
was based on a payroll tax from employer and employee contributions.  The 1935 Act legislated 
(1) a federal but state-run unemployment insurance program, (2) federal grants to states for 
needy dependent children, the blind and the elderly, (3) matching federal funds for state spending 
on vocational rehabilitation, infant and maternal health and aid to crippled children and (4) a 
federal old-age insurance system.
126
  All of the policies were limited in scope; they were targeted 
to people who were in a position of need.   
Unfortunately, this example offers no more of an indication as to whether Roosevelt may 
have been more hindered by “Downsian” platform convergence within the U.S. two-party system 
or if states with even more party fractionalization would face a greater issue with passing larger 
welfare reforms.  Lipset and Marks state, “The same comparative standpoint that explains two-
party duopoly in the United States also reveals that social democratic parties were able to break 
through into established two-party systems elsewhere.”
127
  Therefore, it is unclear whether 
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greater fractionalization within the legislature would have been more or less conducive for larger 
welfare reforms. 
The U.S. system was designed to empower the sub-national states over the federal 
government in certain policy areas.  The separation of powers throughout the U.S. system in the 
form of federalism, bicameralism and an independent executive was believed to keep any one 
body from having too much autonomy.  As Madison explained in The Federalist Papers No. 47, 
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
128
  This lack of autonomy may have been the 
main obstacle for more encompassing welfare policies in the U.S.  The sub-national initiatives 
set a precedent for the type of federal level legislation through public support for more targeted 
programs.  Also, the high level of federalism and larger number of checks in the U.S. has 
required more cooperation over types of welfare policies, which stifled more inclusive social 
policies because there was a higher probability that legislation would not be passed when the 
government was broken up through so many levels.   
The repercussions of these institutional obstacles still persist in the U.S. today; 
consequently, the U.S. has one of the lowest de-commodification scores and one the lowest 
averages for social spending of the 18 OECD countries analyzed by Esping Anderson.  In the 
U.S. system, an inverse relationship may be present between representation throughout the 
federal-unitary dimension features and welfare legislation.  While federalism and checks and 
balances were created to enhance representation, they may have also resulted in less de-
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commodifying welfare reform emergence and growth.  Federalism, bicameralism, and an 
independent executive may have inhibited welfare state emergence, resulting in more targeted 
reforms.  Lipset and Marks address U.S. exceptionalism through the historical record of a 
socialist labor movement that failed to align with unions or the left party.  They concede that 
federalism in the U.S. may have thinly dispersed the power of socialist across a large country and 
hindered the emergence of a viable socialist party.
129
 
Contrary to the U.S. example, Arend Lijphart’s analysis indicates that more 
representative democracies will produce higher de-commodifying welfare policies and therefore 
more egalitarian societies.  However, Lijphart’s analysis focused on the executive-parties 
dimension when the federal-unitary features may actually be more important when analyzing the 
institutional features that have inhibited the emergence of inclusive welfare legislation.  The 
United States’ national-level legislation may have been shaped largely by previous subnational 
level approaches to social policy as well as the structure of the federal government.  FDR and the 
71
st
 through the 77
th
 Congresses were forced not only to consider what precedent the sub-
national states had set, but they also had to consider that the legislation would have to pass 
through the executive and both houses of the legislature. 
Therefore, the institutional features of democracy that may have an impeding impact on 
the emergence of the welfare state and current state levels of de-commodification are not solely 
within the executive-parties dimension but may be even more present through the federal-unitary 
dimension of institutional features.  The United States example raises important questions for 
cross-national studies of the welfare state.  Do other democracies that share these federal-unitary 
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dimension characteristics also have less inclusive social policy legislation?  And was the 
emergence and growth of the welfare state more or less hindered by the U.S.’s predominantly 
two-party system?  The following section will outline the approach to a cross sectional analysis 
and attempt resolve the ambiguous findings in the previous institutional literature. 
Designing an Approach 
 It is often asserted that effectiveness and representation are dichotomous repercussions of 
political institutions.  Efficient institutions are not always considered to produce better legislation 
and effective institutions are not always thought to be the most representative.  Yet Lijphart 
suggests that more representative institutions or consensus democracies produce more effective 
welfare legislation.  Perhaps counterintuitively, in Lijphart’s analysis, effectiveness translates 
into more encompassing social policies.  However, as hypothesized in this analysis, more 
representation in the government through federalism, checks and (possibly) fractionalization may 
actually translate into a more targeted or occupational welfare state. 
Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension needs to be addressed in order to try to determine 
whether more representative institutions actually hinder this type of effectiveness.  Hence, using 
Lijphart’s independent and dependent variables, I have re-run his analysis of the executive-
parties dimension (EXPAR) and added an analysis of his federal-unitary dimension 
(FEDERUN).   To counterbalance Lijphart’s heavily critiqued variable for the effective number 
of parties, I have dismissed his attempt at compensating for closely allied parties and highly 
fractionalized parties.  Instead, I have used the measures from Laakso and Taagepera’s equation 
for the effective number of parties.  To re-create the executive-parties dimension, it was 
necessary to recode the parties variable to the hypothesized direction.  Therefore, unlike 
Lijphart’s study, the new executive-parties index should be negatively correlated to the welfare 
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state if the data support his argument.  In addition, the analysis of the federal-unitary effects 
should be positively correlated to a larger welfare effort if Lijphart’s argument is upheld 
statistically. 
In the hopes that some understanding may be attained about representative institutions 
and their effect on welfare legislation, I also re-specified his variables using the new measures of 
fractionalization (FRAC) as an indicator of the effects of the electoral and party systems, the DPI 
measure for federalism (IFEDER) and a variable for checks that is operationalized as the strength 
of bicameralism and the presence of an independent executive (BICHECK).  These variables 
were analyzed against Esping-Anderson de-commodification index (DECOM) and the adjusted 
de-commodification index (ADECOM) while controlling for the effects of wage coordinated 
bargaining power as a measure of working class strength through unionization (WCOORD) and 
GDP, PPP as an economic indicator (GDPPPP).  However, these regressions only include 15 and 
18 countries, respectively, because the wage coordinated bargaining scale, the de-
commodification index and the adjusted de-commodification index were only available for a 
smaller number of OECD countries.   
To increase the sample size, this regression was then re-run using the same independent 
variables of fractionalization (FRAC), federalism (IFEDER), and checks (BICHECK), but 
instead of controlling for wage coordinated bargaining, I used interest group corporatism 
(INTER2), and instead of using the de-commodification index, I used social expenditure as a 
percent of GDP (SOCSEC).  While admittedly these variables have some problems, the de-
commodification index is also objectionable.  Therefore, each of these regressions will be 
discussed to try to come to a superior understanding of the possible institutional impediments to 
the emergence of the welfare state.  It is hypothesized that federalism, checks and (perhaps) 
 66
fractionalization increase representation of median voter interests which has hindered the 
emergence of social policies in some countries. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Using Lijphart’s data set, the federal-unitary dimension and the executive-parties 
dimension were re-created by combining his institutional variables.  While Lijphart used these 
indices to scale his variables along two dimensions from either -2 to 2 or -3 to 2, the present 
analysis has combined variables for each dimension to create an index but the variables are then 
left at their original measures.  Instead of using Lijphart’s variable for the effective number of 
parties, Laakso and Taagepera’s equation has been used because it does not try to compensate for 
fractionalization within parties or closely allied parties.  Also, in order to combine the measures 
according to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the inverse was taken of the effective parties measure. The 
relationship between my refigured dimension and Lijphart’s original executive-parties dimension 
index scores is strong; they are over ninety percent correlated at the .01 level.  While the results 
are still significant, they are not exactly the same as the findings recorded by Lijphart.  
Lijphart finds a significant correlation between the executive-parties dimension index and 
all three measures of the welfare state.  Lijphart’s original findings are significant on at least the 
.05 level (see Table 1).
130
  However, when the dimension is not scaled from -2 to 2 and the 
effective number of parties is adjusted, the findings are not completely consistent with Lijphart’s 
reported results.   My analysis indicates that the de-commodification index (DECOM) for the 
welfare state is highly significantly correlated to the executive-parties dimension (EXPAR), and 
the magnitude of this significance is -.59.  Also, I find that the correlation between social 
expenditure (ALEXP) and the executive-parties dimension (EXPAR) is significant at the .05 
level and the correlation between the adjusted de-commodification index (ADECOM) and the 
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executive-parties dimension (EXPAR) is slightly weakened but still statistically significant at the 
.10 level (Table 1).  
Table 1:  Executive-Parties Dimension Results 
Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of 5 institutional executive-parties factors combined 
into one index on three indicators for the size of the welfare state.
131
  Lijphart’s original results 
are included for comparison. 
 
De-commodification 
Index 
DECOM 
Adjusted De-
commodification Index 
ADECOM 
Social Expenditure 
ALEXP 
Independent 
Variable Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Executive-
Parties 
Dimension 
(EXPAR) 
 
-0.13*** -0.59 -0.09* -0.43 -0.08** -0.43 
Lijphart’s 
Executive-
Parties 
Dimension 
(EPDIM) 
4.90*** 0.68 4.29** 0.58 2.66** 0.44 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
These findings suggest that there is some validity to Lijphart’s hypothesis that more 
representation in the executive-parties dimension incurs a larger welfare state. The analysis 
indicates that a one standard deviation unit change in the executive-parties index results in a  
-.59 standard deviation unit change in the de-commodification indicator or a -.43 standard 
deviation unit change in the social expenditure variable.  However, as previously asserted, some 
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 The new analysis scaled the executive-parties dimension to suggest a negative correlation to 
the size of the welfare state.  Lijphart’s original analysis included an index that should be 
positively correlated to all three measures of the welfare state.  In all cases, the null hypothesis 
has been rejected on at least the .10 level. 
Sources: Esping-Anderson, G. (1990), Schmidt, M (1997) and Lijphart, A. (1999). 
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of Lijphart’s executive-parties elements are dubious and he dismissed the federal-unitary 
dimension when those factors may have the opposite effect on social policy legislation.  In 
addition, Lijphart failed to control for the level of economic development within states and the 
power of the left to influence legislation at the state level. 
An analogous method was used to evaluate the federal-unitary dimension characteristics.  
Lijphart evaluates the federal-unitary dimension when he analyzes the economic performance of 
states even though he asserts, “[t]he conventional wisdom does not concern itself explicitly with 
the federal-unitary dimension.”
132
  Nevertheless, when he addresses the “kinder, gentler” 
qualities of democracy, he does not address theoretically why the federal-unitary dimension was 
dropped from his analysis.  According to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the federal-unitary dimension 
should be positively correlated to all three of the specified indicators of a larger welfare state.  In 
order to test his theory with the five federal-unitary variables, I have combined all five indicators 
into one index (FEDERUN) and ran a bivariate regression using each of his three specified 
dependent variables for the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM, ALEXP).   
Contrary to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the relationship between the federal-unitary dimension 
(FEDERUN) and social expenditure (ALEXP) is negatively statistically significant at the .05 
level.  The relationship between the federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN) and the adjusted de-
commodification index (ADECOM) is also negatively correlated and it is significant at the .05 
level (see Table 2).  According to these findings, and contrary to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the 
presence of more federalism and a greater number of checks may have actually resulted in more 
occupationally dependent or targeted social policy legislation. The analysis results for the 
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federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN) and the de-commodification index (DECOM) are not as 
statistically significant, but, unlike the executive-parties dimension findings, these results are 
concurrent with the major critique of the de-commodification index.  The adjusted index 
compensates for three countries that researchers have repeatedly criticized due to their scores.  
Therefore, it is theoretically grounded that the adjusted index might have more significance 
while the relationship with the original de-commodification index is slightly weakened (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2: Federal-Unitary Dimension Results 
Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of 5 institutional federal-unitary factors combined into 
one index on three indicators for the size of the welfare state.
133
 
 
De-commodification 
Index 
DECOM 
Adjusted De-
commodification Index 
ADECOM 
Social Expenditure 
ALEXP 
Independent 
Variable Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Unstand. 
Coef. (b) 
Stand. 
Coef. 
(beta) 
Federal-
Unitary 
Dimension 
(FEDERUN) 
-0.62* -0.33 -1.03** -0.55 -0.78** -0.46 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
The results from re-running Lijphart’s analysis suggest that there may be mixed results 
from the vertical and horizontal institutional features.  More representation through the 
executive-parties features may actually increase the likelihood of more encompassing social 
policy legislation while more representation through the federal-unitary dimension may result in 
less encompassing welfare legislation.  These results support the findings by Hicks and Swank.  
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 This negative correlation signifies a significant relationship that is the inverse of Lijphart’s 
hypothesis.  More representation through the federal-unitary dimension may decrease the 
probability of a larger welfare state.  Sources:  Lijphart, A. (1999).  Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). 
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Centralized government may augment social policy spending, but “consensus systems may arise 
in political contexts that legitimize – indeed, foster – redistributive policies.”
134
  Perhaps less 
representation in the legislative process produces platform convergence within parties that may 
result in less encompassing legislative proposals, yet more representation of the median voter’s 
interest through the horizontal institutional structures may diminish the possibility for 
encompassing social policies.   
In order to come to a clearer explanation of these institutional effects, it is important that 
the relevant variables be re-specified and evaluated in a more comprehensive analysis.  As 
previously stated, many of Lijphart’s variables are either irrelevant or lead to ad hoc 
explanations.  Therefore, delineating fractionalization, federalism and checks as the pertinent 
factors may lend more understanding to the role of institutions in the emergence of the welfare 
state.  Fractionalization, federalism and checks may increase representation of the median voters’ 
interests, which could then translate into more occupationally dependent or targeted social 
policies.   
Fractionalization, Federalism and Checks 
 To analyze the effects of fractionalization, federalism and checks, I have run three main 
regression analyses.  First, while it is largely acknowledged that the de-commodification index 
has some theoretical as well as measurement and case size related problems, an analysis will be 
discussed concerning the effects of these three independent variables (FRAC, BICHECK, 
IFEDER) on both the de-commodification index (DECOM) and the adjusted de-
commodification index (ADECOM).  Second, the analysis was run again using social 
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expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC) in order to include all of the 32 cases with available 
data.   
When analyzing the relationship between the three independent variables (FRAC, 
BICHECK, IFEDER) and the de-commodification index (DECOM), and controlling for GDP, 
PPP (GDPPPP) and the wage coordination score (WCOORD) for each of the 18 countries, my 
findings suggest that the level of fractionalization is the only statistically significant independent 
variable at the .05 level, yet the level of fractionalization is positively correlated instead of 
negatively correlated to the level of de-commodification.  These results support Lijphart’s 
findings for the executive-parties dimension index (see Table 3).  Therefore, these results support 
the idea that higher levels of fractionalization within the legislatures may actually increase the 
likelihood for more encompassing welfare legislation. 
Table 3:  Institutional Impediments to the Size of the Welfare State 
Two multivariate regression analyses of fractionalization, federalism and checks on two 
dependent variables: the de-commodification index and the adjusted de-commodification 
index.
135
 
Table 3 continued on the next page. 
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 Sources: Comparative Welfare States Data Set (2004).  Database of Political Institutions 
(2001).  Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). IMF World Development Indicators (2001).  Lijphart, A. 
(1999). 
 
De-commodification Index 
DECOM 
Adjusted De-commodification Index 
ADECOM 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstand. Coef. 
(b) 
Stand. Coef. 
(Beta) 
Unstand. Coef. 
(b) 
Stand. Coef. 
(beta) 
Fractionalization 
(FRAC) 
 
37.01** 0.50 12.86 0.19 
Checks 
(BICHECK) 
-0.42 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 
 
Federalism 
(IFEDER) 
 
-0.21 -0.04 -0.63 -0.14 
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*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
However, as previously discussed, the de-commodification index is exceptionable.  When 
the three most disputed cases within the index are dropped from the analysis, fractionalization is 
no longer significantly correlated to the adjusted welfare state index.  Yet dropping these cases 
from the de-commodfication index is equivocal as well because when these 3 cases are 
dismissed, the N falls to only 15 countries. So as to give a better representation of the varied 
states available for analysis, the social expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC) can be used 
as measure of the size of the welfare state and the interest group corporatism index (INTER2) 
can be used as a control variable in place of the wage coordinated bargaining score.  If the 
regressions are re-run using social expenditure as a measure of the welfare state and interest 
group corporatism as a measure of the power of the left, the results may elucidate the 
institutional effects of fractionalization, federalism and checks on social policy implementation. 
When fractionalization, federalism and checks are analyzed with social expenditure while 
controlling for GDP, PPP and interest group corporatism, the results become clearer.  All three 
variables are statistically significant at least the .05 level (see Table 4).  However, the results for 
fractionalization and checks support Lijphart’s findings.  These results suggest that 
fractionalization within the legislation does not impede social policy legislation; it may actually 
Wage 
Coordinated 
Bargaining 
(WCOORD) 
 
2.27* 0.36 2.44** 0.44 
Economic 
Development 
(GDPPPP) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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facilitate the emergence of a larger welfare state.  These results also suggest that checks in the 
form of bicameralism and an independent executive may support the passage of welfare 
legislation. 
Table 4:  Institutional Impediments to the Amount of Social Expenditure 
Multivariate regression analysis for fractionalization, federalism and checks on social 
expenditure as a percent of GDP controlling for interest group corporatism and GDP, PPP.
136
 
 
Social Expenditure 
SOCSEC 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
RC 
(b) 
Standardized 
RC 
(Beta) 
 
Fractionalization 
(FRAC) 
23.45*** 0.53 
Checks 
(BICHECK) 
1.69** 0.42 
Federalism 
(IFEDER) 
-0.96** -0.33 
Interest Group Corporatism 
(INTER2) 
2.68* 0.23 
Economic Development 
(GDPPPP) 
 
0.00 0.03 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
Federalism appears to have the opposite effect.  The measure for federalism is 
statistically significant at the .05 level and it is negatively correlated to social expenditure.  This 
finding implies that more representation in the form of federalism hinders the emergence of the 
welfare state (see Table 4). However, all of these variables are similar in their magnitude so to 
delineate whether one has a greater impact is difficult.  Fractionalization has the greatest 
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magnitude at 0.53, but the checks index and the federalism indicator are close behind it at 0.42 
and -0.33.  Therefore, one hesitates to stipulate that one variable has that much of a greater 
impact than the others.
137
   
Discussion 
These findings offer mixed results about the possible effects of more representative 
institutions on the emergence of the welfare state.  On the one hand, representation in the form of 
federalism is correlated with less welfare spending.  Therefore, there may be some validity to the 
theory that subnational policies more effectively transfer the median voters’ interests by setting a 
precedent for types of national level welfare legislation.  On the other hand, fractionalization 
within the legislature and checks in the form of bicameralism and an independent executive are 
statistically correlated with larger amounts of welfare spending.  These results may be due 
partially to the existence of Downsian platform convergence within two-party systems.   
Anthony Downs formulated a theory about the self-interested actions of politicians and 
citizens to try to determine whether the private motives of men are incompatible with the 
functions they serve in government (politics or economics).  Downs stipulates that (in two-party 
systems) political parties may produce “brand names” to help voters make decisions about whom 
to vote for in the election yet their platforms will converge because they are both trying to retain 
the median voter’s support.
138
  James Snyder and Michael Ting build upon Down’s work to 
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evaluate whether the level of information available to voters through a party’s label will create 
more or less of a convergence on platforms.  Snyder and Ting state,  
“[O]ur model refines the standard Downsian logic:  both convergent and 
divergent equilibria exist, depending on the benefit of holding office relative to 
the cost of party membership.  In all cases, however, parties are able to convey 
brandname information through their platform choices.”
139
   
 
Therefore, when analyzing the effects of fractionalization on the welfare initiatives, it is 
important to acknowledge that multiparty systems may facilitate a party’s ability to propose 
larger initiatives as well as increase representation for individuals who prefer larger social policy 
reforms.  If Downsian platform convergence is present, two party-systems may better represent 
the median voter’s preference for occupationally dependent or targeted policies.  However, if 
Snyder and Ting are correct, two-party systems may also have platform divergence when party 
labels are less informative.
140
   
For checks, the results insinuate that greater representation through bicameralism and an 
independent executive may actually facilitate social policy spending.  However, the checks index 
was created using Lijphart’s measure for bicameralism and the DPI checks variable.  The checks 
variable included a measure for the veto gates within a system including the following features:   
(1) when the executive wields the only check, 
(2) when the executive is competitively elected, 
(3) when the opposition controls the legislature, 
(4) for each chamber in a presidential system, 
(5) for each party closely allied with the executive’s party more so than 
opposition party and 
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(6) in parliamentary systems, for every party in the coalition closer to the largest 
opposition party.
141
 
 
Therefore, the CHECKS variable actually contains a measure for fractionalization between the 
executive and legislative sectors of government.  If fractionalization actually augments social 
spending, it may be necessary to measure vertical veto gates separately from party system 
effects. 
One main issue with these findings is that social expenditure is a used as a measure of the 
welfare state.  It is possible that the funding of welfare policies is actually more effective or 
efficient with different institutions than the passing of encompassing reforms.  Stated more 
clearly, some institutions may be more of an impediment to universal policies than they are to 
budgeting money for certain policy areas such as government worker or civil service benefits.  It 
has been stipulated previously that this phenomenon is present in Austria where the civil service 
industry is highly funded in comparison to other programs.  Therefore, social expenditure as a 
percent of GDP may not be a clear measure when trying to decipher which countries have a 
larger welfare state because it is a measure of how much a state spends on their welfare programs 
and not a measure of where or how the money is allocated or whether the policies are more or 
less de-commodifying throughout the state.  In addition, measuring national levels of social 
expenditure might negate the taxing and spending influence that subnational regions have over 
welfare expenditure.  Using national levels of social expenditure may systematically skew the 
total amount of money spent on welfare in highly federalized countries. 
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These results suggest that federalism may inhibit social expenditure while 
fractionalization and checks may augment welfare spending.  Yet social expenditure is used a 
proxy for the size of the welfare state.  Subsequently, these factors may also be linked to a 
qualitative description of social policies across some states.  For instance, the results suggest that 
a higher degree of federalism impedes social spending, but that may or may not be reflected in 
the existence of more targeted welfare programs.  Conversely, higher fractionalization and 
greater checks may correspond to increased levels of social spending which may indicate that 
they also incur more encompassing social policies.  The correlation between welfare spending 
and the size of the welfare state will be largely contingent on the whether the state allocates 
social funding evenly through societal sectors or, like in Austria, the funds are more largely 
apportioned to a particular segment of society.  Also, there are some states that may spend more 
on their welfare policies yet have less encompassing policies, so the relationship between social 
expenditure and the size of the welfare state may also be subject to how efficiently the state 
allocates resources.   
Even in contemplation of the issues entrenched in using social expenditure as a measure 
of the welfare state, the correlation between the de-commodification index and social 
expenditure is 70%, thus there is some legitimacy in not only precedence, but also the 
relationship between these two measures of the welfare state.  As a result, it may be presumed 
that fractionalization and checks could be facilitating factors in the emergence and growth of the 
welfare state while federalism may create an impediment. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of capitalism and industrialization changed the relationship between the 
state, society and the market.  Workers were being pushed into a competition for wages against 
each other as well as against the reality of the market.  Concurrently, there was a transition from 
the traditional authority structures of the church and community to the state, yet the beliefs of the 
role of welfare embedded in feudal societies may have been maintained.  Welfare was targeted 
toward people who were in a position of need through local poor laws then subnational 
legislation (when present) and finally through federal level legislation in states with more 
representative structures.  The median voters’ interests were still focused on the idea that able-
bodied persons should provide for themselves and the state should act as final protection against 
the market for people in a position of need.  However, the translation of these interests was 
facilitated or impeded through the existence of certain governmental institutions. 
It is often stipulated in the institutional literature that a fundamental trade-off exists 
between effective government and efficient or representative government.  Most notably, 
institutional scholars focus on institutional impediments in the form of veto points and veto 
players to evaluate this possible trade-off. This study attempted to reconcile more representative 
institutions through their vertical and horizontal structures with less encompassing welfare 
legislation.  The main hypothesis was that institutions that engender a greater degree of 
representation – like that of federalism, checks and multiple parties within the legislature – 
would be better at translating into legislation the median voters interests for targeted social 
policies.  In the sense that effectiveness would reflect less government autonomy concerning 
social policies, these institutional features would correspond with more effective policies, yet a 
less efficient policy-making process.   
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The results for these analyses are highly ambiguous.  Lijphart’s variables suggest that 
more representation in the executive-parties features may facilitate a larger welfare state across 
all three measures.  However, his measures also suggest that more representation through the 
federal-unitary institutions invite less encompassing welfare implementation.  While interest 
group corporatism, central bank independence and constitutional rigidity may have an influence 
on welfare legislation, they are not usually considered institutional features that are determined 
by state builders. Additionally, using judicial review contains an ad hoc explanation, ipso facto 
the institutional variables of fractionalization, federalism and checks through the legislative and 
executive branches were operationalized as the pertinent elements for analysis.   
The findings from the de-commodification index analysis do not strongly support the idea 
that more representative institutions result in a less de-commodifying welfare state.  
Fractionalization within the legislature is actually correlated to higher levels of de-
commodification.  However, the sample size for that analysis is too small and the measures 
within the de-commodification index are problematic.
142
  Also, when the three most debatable 
cases are dropped to create the adjusted de-commodification index, the effect of fractionalization 
recedes and the analysis no longer suggests that these institutional features have an effect on the 
level of de-commodification within the state’s social policy programs. 
To increase the sample size and attempt to decipher the relevance of the effects of 
fractionalization, federalism and checks on the welfare state, social expenditure as a percent of 
GDP was used as a proxy for the size of the welfare state.  These results suggest that Lijphart’s 
executive-parties dimension results were accurate.  Fractionalization within the legislature may 
augment social spending.  As Hicks and Swank stipulate, this effect may be due to the Downsian 
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platform convergence found in two-party systems.  Fractionalization may increase the 
representation of various interests, including those who support a larger welfare state.  This 
analysis also suggests that more checks through the system in the form of an independent 
executive and a greater degree of bicameralism may also enhance social spending.  
Theoretically, these results are counterintuitive, especially when the results for the index of 
federalism imply that a greater degree of federalism impedes the amount of social expenditure.   
The results form these analyses, then, are ambiguous.  The results that keep appearing 
suggest that fractionalization is correlated with higher social spending and a larger welfare state.  
The checks within the system tend to demonstrate less stable results.  The elements included in 
the checks variable are included in Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension and executive-parties 
dimension.  When these dimensions are regressed on all three measures of the welfare state, the 
results indicate that federalism and bicameralism may hinder the emergence of encompassing 
welfare reforms, yet an independent executive may facilitate the emergence and growth of the 
welfare state.  When analyzed as a separate variable, there are no findings on the effect of checks 
on the de-commodifying capacity of the welfare state.  However, it is significantly correlated to 
higher levels of social spending.  Federalism seems to be consistently correlated with a smaller 
welfare state both through Lijphart’s measures of the federal-unitary features and through the 
regression analysis on social spending.  However, there is no finding on the effect of federalism 
on the de-commodification level of welfare states.  This finding may be due partially to the 
numerous issues embedded in the de-commodification index. Consequently, this analysis leaves 
unanswered questions about the overall influence of institutional features on the size of the 
welfare state as opposed to the amount of money spent on the social policies. 
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A Prescription for Future Endeavors 
Future research must try first and foremost to construct a variable to properly measure the 
size of the welfare state.  If comparable data can be obtained, it is possible to use Esping-
Anderson’s theory behind the de-commodification index and measure the replacement rate, 
contributory requirements and population covered by the programs across a large number of 
states with varied economic levels of development.  The issues embedded in creating this index 
have already been addressed, but this study tried to build the index using Lijphart’s original 
sample size of 36 countries.  It may be beneficial to examine which countries have available data 
and construct the index for those countries.  However, if this tactic is used, it is imperative that a 
varied sample of countries is used instead of focusing predominantly on OECD countries.   At 
the same time, countries with a high degree of federalism may have systematically skewed 
measures for the size of the welfare state and the amount of social expenditure because the 
subnational regions may administer some of the welfare within their respective region.  
Therefore, a measure for the welfare state should also try to incorporate subnational welfare 
policies. 
Additionally, a more in-depth measure for federalism and checks should be constructed 
to allow for a hypothesized degree of influence for each of the factors, including the independent 
executive, bicameralism and federalism.  While Switzerland is the only state deemed to be a true 
referendum democracy, it may be advantageous to construct a measure for federalism that also 
compensates for the existence of subnational as well as national referenda.  In addition, it is 
plausible that judicial review works as an a priori disincentive for welfare legislation on the 
federal level.  Legislators may be less likely to propose larger policies if they fear that the 
policies will be deemed unconstitutional.  Therefore, it may be beneficial to include the strength 
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and/or historical precedence for issues of constitutionality in welfare legislation to decide 
whether judicial review should be included as an institutional inhibitor. 
It may also be a relevant endeavor to test Downsian platform convergence through either 
a dummy variable that separates predominantly two-party systems and multi-party systems or 
through an analysis of the actual welfare policy platforms of the parties.  Similarly, a cross 
national survey may be beneficial in determining whether the median voter actually prefers 
targeted or occupationally dependent welfare policies in more representative states that have not 
had the autonomy to shape the culture around more encompassing reforms. 
If future research builds off of these findings by incorporating the specified issues, the 
results may indicate that the vertical composition of a country has the opposite effects on the 
emergence of the welfare state in comparison to that of the horizontal composition of a state.  
Perhaps federalism is the main institutional inhibitor to the welfare state, while more 
representation within the national government augments social policy and results in more 
encompassing welfare policies.  Future research needs to clarify and explain the possibility of 
these mixed effects. 
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APPENDIX A: 
LIST OF 32 COUNTRIES IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Country Name 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Canada 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad & Tobago 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AUL 
AUT 
BAH 
BAR 
BEL 
CAN 
COL 
CR 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GER 
GRE 
ICE 
IRE 
ISR 
ITA 
JAM 
JPN 
LUX 
MAL 
MAU 
NET 
NOR 
POR 
SPA 
SWE 
SWI 
TRI 
UK 
US 
VEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Code 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
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APPENDIX B: 
LIJPHART’S MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS FEATURES 
 
 
MAJORITARIAN FEATURES CONSENSUS FEATURES 
Executive power concentration in one 
party majority cabinets 
Executive power sharing in multi-party 
cabinets 
Executive is dominant in executive-
legislative association 
Executive and Legislature(s) have 
balance of power between them 
Two-party system Multi-party system 
Majoritarian electoral system 
Proportional Representation electoral 
system E
x
ec
u
ti
v
e-
P
ar
ti
es
 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
Higher interest group pluralism Higher interest group corporatism 
Centralized government Federal and decentralized government 
Unicameralism in legislature Bicameralism in legislature 
More easily amended constitution 
Extraordinary support needed to amend 
constitution 
Legislatures decide constitutionality of 
legislation 
Presence of Judicial Review to decide 
constitutionality of laws F
ed
er
al
-U
n
it
ar
y
 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
Central Banks are dependent on 
executive 
Independent Central Banks 
 
  
Source:  Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy:  Government Forms and Performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven and London, Yale University Press. 
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APPENDIX C: 
ESPING-ANDERSON’S COMBINED DE-COMMODIFICATION INDEX 
 
 
 Countries De-commodification Score 
 
 
Socialist welfare regimes 
Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Austria 
39.1 
38.3 
38.1 
32.4 
32.4 
31.1 
 
 
Conservative welfare regimes 
Switzerland 
Finland 
Germany 
France 
Japan 
Italy 
29.8 
29.2 
27.7 
27.5 
27.1 
24.1 
 
 
 
Liberal welfare regimes 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Canada 
New Zealand 
United States  
Australia 
23.4 
23.3 
22.0 
17.1 
13.8 
13.0 
 
 
Source:  Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
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APPENDIX D: 
PENSIONS REPLACEMENT RATE SAMPLE FOR 36 COUNTRIES 
 
 MAX. OLD-
AGE 
PENSION 
BENEFIT 
(PER 
MONTH) 
MIN. OLD 
AGE 
PENSION 
BENEFIT 
(PER 
MONTH) 
AVERAGE 
MO. 
WAGES 
(FIGURED 
OR GIVEN) 
MAX 
REPLACE-
MENT 
RATE (%) 
MIN 
REPLACE-
MENT 
RATE (%) 
MIN 
REPL 
RATE 
GIVEN 
(%) 
MAX 
REPL 
RATE 
GIVEN 
(%) 
 SSP SSP ILO figured figured SSP SSP 
1 928.40  3129.22 0.30    
2 653.19  2059.73 0.32    
3  212.28    0.40 0.60 
4  420.00    0.40  
5 3280.64 832.64 2589.00    0.60 
6 166.00 166.00 1719.00 0.10 0.10   
7 461.55  2822.72 0.16    
8  min wage 624656.00   0.60 0.80 
9 465207.00 36000.00 166804.00 2.79 0.22 0.60 0.60 
10 4648.00 4648.00      
11 496.38 11.21 2372.00 0.21 0.00   
12 619.00 558.87 1494.00    0.50 
13 1175.85  2281.91 0.52    
14 2966.00 392.16 1241.80 2.39 0.32   
15 21249.00 21249.00 197800.00 0.11 0.11   
16 75.00 75.00 1158.60 0.06 0.06   
17 669.20  2153.16 0.31    
18   6859.00   0.24 0.24 
19  412.18 16714.12  0.02   
20 3600.00 3600.00 40087.35 0.09 0.09   
21 66208.33  302100.00 0.22    
22  329.75 3740.43  0.09   
23 346.12 75.60 400.40 0.86 0.19   
24 7795.00 1900.00 11103.00 0.70 0.17   
25 921.28 921.28 2792.00 0.33 0.33   
26 996.36 996.36 3711.51 0.27 0.27   
27   29819.77   1.00 1.00 
28 n/a n/a      
29 325.33 208.00 1046.50 0.31 0.20   
30  411.76 2097.92  0.20   
31  6975.75 17587.92  0.40   
32 2060.00 1030.00 6184.00 0.33 0.17   
33  620.00 7451.74  0.08   
34 309.80  1950.40 0.16    
35 1741.00  2014.64 0.86    
36  9000.00 174424.00  0.05 0.40  
 
Sources:  Social Security Programs Throughout the World (Online).  ILO, Laborsta (Online).
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APPENDIX E: 
ALTERNATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Multivariate regression analysis of fractionalization, federalism and decentralization on social 
expenditure as a percent of GDP, but controlling for interest group corporatism and RGDP per 
capita instead of GDPPPP and interest group corporatism. 
 Social Expenditure 
Independent Variables 
Unstandardized Regression 
Coefficient 
(b) 
Standardized Regression 
Coefficient 
(Beta) 
 
Fractionalization 
(FRAC) 
 
22.673*** .544 
Federalism 
(IFEDER) 
 
-.927** -.324 
Checks 
(BICHECK) 
 
1.532** .360 
Interest Group 
Corporatism 
(INTER2) 
 
2.46 0.21 
Economic Development 
(RGDP) 
 
0.00 0.06 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
 
 
Sources: Database of Political Institutions (2001). IMF, World Development Indicators (2001).  
Lijphart, A. (1999). 
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Multivariate regression analysis of fractionalization, federalism and decentralization on social 
expenditure as a percent of GDP, but controlling only for GDP, PPP and dropping interest group 
corporatism as a control variable. 
 Social Expenditure 
Independent Variables 
Unstandardized Regression 
Coefficient 
(b) 
Standardized Regression 
Coefficient 
(Beta) 
 
Fractionalization 
(FRAC) 
 
28.929*** .647 
Federalism 
(IFEDER) 
 
-1.011** -.350 
Checks 
(BICHECK) 
 
1.579** .394 
Economic Development 
(GDPPPP) 
 
0.00 0.04 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test) 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) 
 
 
Sources: Database of Political Institutions (2001). IMF, World Development Indicators (2001).  
Lijphart, A. (1999). 
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